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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the law relating to the disclosure, by employees, of 
information in the public interest. It examines the possibility of protecting 
these employees, commonly known as ''whistleblowers", from victimisation 
in the workplace which arises as a result of their disclosures. The law in 
its present state discourages rather than encourages public interest 
disclosures of information, despite a variety of methods of protection 
which are available to the whistleblower. Several countries overseas have 
introduced protective legislation, and it is argued that New Zealand 
should do likewise, with some necessary modifications. 
This paper aims to demonstrate that there are compelling constitutional 
and practical arguments which suggest that encouragement of 
whistleblower disclosures in New Zealand would be desirable. The types 
of disclosures and the method of protection must, however, be carefully 
worked out in order adequately to protect the interests of employers, 
employees and the public. The author believes that the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsman should be extended to deal with whistleblower complaints. 
WORD LENGTH 
The length of this paper, excluding the contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices, is approximately 18,000 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Early in 1994, a new term was introduced into common parlance in New 
Zealand. The case of Neil Pugmire is a classic example of 
''whistleblowing", which captured the attention of the New Zealand public 
for many weeks, and created a good deal of debate. 
The term is an unusually colloquial one to find in a formal legal context, 
but is strangely apt for its purpose. It creates images of someone raising 
the alarm when danger threatens, or of a warning blast on a police 
whistle, or of a referee ensuring fair play. Legally speaking, a 
''whistleblower'' is a person who reveals information about issues of 
significant public interest. Examples of such issues are illegal activities, 
misuse of public funds, or situations which constitute a serious danger to 
public health, or safety. Whistleblowers typically have access to this 
information in the course of their employment. 1 
Such disclosures are not uncommon in this country, but generally appear 
in the form of "leaks" to the news media. It is rare for the informant to 
become publicly known. Consequently, we do not usually discover what 
happens to the informants when, as often happens, their employer 
manages to pinpoint the "leak". The problems faced by whistleblowers 
have remained largely hidden until now. 
A The Case of Neil Pugmire 
Neil Pugmire revealed that psychiatric institutions such as Lake Alice 
Hospital, where he worked, were required by the new mental health 
legislation2 to release certain categories of patients into the community. 
From his experience as a charge nurse in the secure unit, he firmly 
1 To avoid confusion in this paper, the general term "employment" (and, consequently, the term 
"employee and employer") refers both to contracts of service and contracts for services. 
Whistleblowers can be either employees under a contract of service, (to whom the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 applies) or independent contractors (to whom it does not). The principles 
governing whistleblower protection are the same whichever the mode of employment, and no 
distinction should be made. 
2 The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
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believed that some of these patients posed a very significant danger to 
the public. This opinion was later fully vindicated. 3 
Mr Pugmire raised his concerns with the Minister of Health, in a letter 
containing confidential details about a particular patient. These were 
included to provide a specific example in order to substantiate his claims. 
When nothing happened, even after trying other Government channels, 
he copied the letter to Labour's justice spokesperson, Hon Phil Goff MP. 
Mr Goff released the letter to the news media, including the information 
about the patient and the name of the informant. 
Good Health Wanganui, the Crown Health Enterprise which employs staff 
at Lake Alice, promptly suspended Mr Pugmire for misconduct in 
releasing patient information. After a very public debate, two interlocutory 
hearings in the Employment Court, and a great deal of stress for all 
parties, Neil Pugmire was able to return to his normal duties.4 
This brief summary of one particular case of whistleblowing illustrates 
several typical features of the area. First, a whistleblower is an employee 
with a grievance about a matter of significant public interest. Secondly, 
employers, often understandably, tend not to approve of disclosures of 
information by employees. Thirdly, the whistleblower can suffer severe 
detriment in his or her employment as a result of the employer's 
displeasure. Consequently, employees who feel they should reveal 
information in the public interest find themselves living constantly "on the 
edge". 
B. Public and Private Concerns 
Whistleblowing is a subject which is itself on the edge, at the interface 
between public and private law. This adds to its interest, although it is not 
altogether unusual in this regard. It is often said that the distinction 
3 One of the patients released under the "loophole" in the legislation raped a two-year old child 
within a very short time of his release. The new Minister of Health, Mrs Jenny Shipley, appeared 
to accept that the definition of "mental disorder" in section 2 was too narrow to allow for the 
continued confinement of many dangerous patients. She estimated that there were thirty seven 
potentially dangerous patients who might go free . The legislation is to be amended. 
4 For a full discussion of Neil Pugmire's side of the story, see A. Hubbard "Why I blew the 
whistle" (interview with Neil Pugmire) NZ Listener May 14-20 1994, 16-22. The facts are also 
neatly summarised in Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui Ltd , unreported, 10 March 1994, 
Employment Court Wellington Registry WEC 6/94. 
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between the public and the private sectors is becoming ever more 
blurred. 5 This is certainly true of New Zealand over the last decade, 
especially given the extensive restructuring of the state with the creation 
of state-owned companies, and privatisation of formerly state-owned 
assets. Methods of statutory regulation of these bodies, and rules of 
administrative law, have had to adapt accordingly.6 Recent changes in 
employment law mean that public and private sector employees are dealt 
with according to the same principles of contract. It is also becoming more 
difficult to determine who exactly is a public servant, given the scaling-
down of the core public service, and the increased tendencies of 
government to contract out service provision. 
All these issues are relevant to the whistleblowing debate. It raises 
constitutional issues, such as principles of open government and 
accountability. It entails discussion of protection of human rights, 
particularly freedom of speech and privacy. It impacts on present 
administrative law agencies, for example the Ombudsman. All these are 
concerns of the State, and belong to the area of public law. However, 
whistleblower protection also affects private, contractual employment 
relationships, either in organisations which do work for government or 
which use public funding, or in organisations whose area of activity could 
be said to be of significant public interest. Protecting "public interest" 
informants from retribution by private employers is a direct interference by 
the state with the way people choose to run their businesses. 
This is always going to be a controversial matter. The Whistleblower 
Protection Bill proposes to apply to both sectors. I agree with this 
universal coverage. When it comes to public interest information, no 
useful purpose can be served by drawing a largely artificial distinction 
between public and private sectors, and then having to cope with the 
inevitable grey areas. The limitations on interference with business 
efficiency and autonomy will depend on what authority is created to deal 
with grievances, and on what types of information are deemed to be in the 
s Galbraith refers to it as "the shrinking divide" . See AR Galbraith QC "Deregulation, 
Privatisation and Corporatisation of Crown Activity: How Will the Law Respond?" in Conference 
Papers (Vol. 1) (New Zealand Law Conference, Wellington, 1993) 226, at 240. 
6 For one of the most recent statements on this subject, see M. Chen "Accountability of SOEs and 
Crown-Owned Companies: Judicial Review, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Impact 
ofMMP" (1994) NZLJ 296. 
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public interest. The legislative drafters need to ensure that these are no 
wider than necessary and are as clear as possible. 
C. Academic literature 
The topic of whistleblowing has only very recently come to be considered 
as a discrete area of law, with the enactment of statutes in the United 
States and Australia, and proposed legislation elsewhere. Yet, already, 
there has been a good deal of academic comment, although it tends to 
focus narrowly on one or two of the many possible issues. Probably the 
most comprehensive work which I have encountered is that of Yvonne 
Cripps, who canvasses many of the issues raised in this field. 7 However, 
her book is centred largely on English law, and therefore much of the 
discussion is inapplicable to a New Zealand context. For example, the 
existence of the Official Secrets Act in England creates a presumption of 
secrecy in government. The exact converse is true in New Zealand, where 
principles of open government have been adopted. Official information is 
available to the public, with only limited exceptions.8 The exceptions arise 
where a countervailing public interest requires the information to be 
withheld.9 
Employment law, on which much of the discussion hinges, also differs 
widely between various jurisdictions. A large amount of the United States 
literature on the subject, therefore, is also inapplicable, because of the 
authors' focus on the effect of whistleblower protection on the strict 
"employment-at-will" doctrine. 10 British employment law, as discussed by 
Yvonne Cripps and others, is also not wholly transferrable to a New 
Zealand environment, especially since the passing of our Employment 
7 Y. Cripps The Legal Implications of Disclosure in the Public Interest: An Analysis of 
Prohibitions and Protections with Particular Reference to Employers and Employees (ESC 
Publishing Ltd, Oxford, 1986). 
8 Official Information Act 1982, s. 5. 
9 Official Information Act, s. 4 (c). The exceptions are contained in ss 6, 7 and 9. 
10 This doctrine applies where there is no collective or individual employment contract, and 
allows either party to terminate for any reason at any time. All New Zealand employment is 
contract-based, however. For a useful summary of the American position, see VF Kuhlmann-
Macro "Blowing the Whistle on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine" (1992) 41 Drake Law Review 
339. 
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Contracts Act 1991 . However, the general comments on whistleblowing 
are useful. 11 
The Australian contributions to the debate also have to be treated with 
care. The concern about whistleblowing in Australia arose as a result of 
severe problems with corruption in government, particularly in 
Queensland.12 This problem simply does not exist on the same scale in 
New Zealand, perhaps in part because our more comprehensive 
application of open government principles acts as a deterrent. 
Whistleblower protection legislation in this country may therefore be said 
to be aimed at slightly different, but no less important concerns. 
The media has conducted much of the discussion about whistleblowing, 
as particular cases come to light. Such reports cannot, however, do much 
more than examine whistleblowing in the specific context of the case. This 
method of focusing on a narrow area of interest is also characteristic of 
many of the legal articles on whistleblowing. This is hardly surprising, 
given the ad hoe nature of the law on the subject, but the time has come 
to bring together the major issues for consideration into a single 
document, and to present a principled overview of whistleblowing as it 
applies to New Zealand. As the considerable moves towards 
whistleblower protection overseas indicate, this is an idea whose time 
seems to have come. 
D. A Summary of the Argument 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate why I believe that whistleblower 
protection legislation is desirable in New Zealand. A summary of the 
course of my argument is as follows. 
Part I of this paper discusses the present position of whistleblowers in 
New Zealand. It outlines briefly how whistleblowing affects both the 
informants and those about whom the information is disclosed. It then 
11 For example, see GG James "In Defense of Whistle Blowing" in -Hoffmann W, Moore J (eds) 
Business Ethics: Readings and Cases in Corporate Morality (McGrawHill, New York, 1984). 
12 GE Fitzgerald QC, chairperson, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and 
Associated Police Misconduct Report (Queensland Government Printer, Brisbane, 1989) 370. 
The Fitzgerald Report recommended the introduction of whistleblower protection legislation as a 
means to protect against corruption. The inquiry was, itself, sparked by the revelations of a 
whistleblower. 
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analyses the current legal position, to ascertain what action is commonly 
taken against whistleblowers, and what legal protection is available to 
them. My conclusion here is that, although a variety of potential avenues 
for protection exist, they are insufficient actively to encourage 
whistleblowers to reveal public interest information. The risks involved 
with breaching confidentiality in the employment relationship remain too 
high for any but the crusaders of this world to undertake. Reducing the 
risks will prompt more timorous employees to consider disclosing 
wrongdoing which they discover at work. More comprehensive protection 
for whistleblowers is therefore required. 
Part II considers what types of disclosures might be said to be worthy of 
encouragement, and what the framework of any whistleblower legislation 
should be. To determine this, I consider various overseas examples of 
such legislation, to see what common themes emerge, and how particular 
problems are dealt with. Largely prompted by the Pugmire incident, Phil 
Goff has recently introduced a private Member's Bill into Parliament in 
New Zealand. 13 The overseas material is compared with these projected 
statutory provisions, and an assessment made as to appropriate types of 
disclosure. 
Part Ill aims to establish a case for encouraging these disclosures in New 
Zealand. It examines how encouragement of whistleblowing complements 
constitutional principles such as open government, and also sits well with 
such concepts as freedom of speech. This section also considers relevant 
issues arising from state restructuring, both in fairly general terms and as 
regards public service employment in particular. The conclusion here is 
that encouragement of public interest disclosures will fit well with the 
recent changes in New Zealand, and will lead to higher standards of 
behaviour, particularly in the public service. 
In Part IV, I argue that, given that a case can be made for whistleblower 
protection, the final question is what structure is to be put in place to 
achieve that. Many parties have interests at stake when one is 
considering information of a more or less confidential nature. A system to 
deal with whistleblower complaints should, therefore, be seen to achieve 
the best balance possible between the interests of employer, employee 
13 The Whistleblowers Protection Bill 1994. 
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and public. If this is done, all parties will have faith in the system, and 
support it. 
It might be possible simply to amend existing legislation to deal with these 
concerns. Ideally, however, one authority should be nominated as the 
recipient of whistleblower complaints, given the authority to investigate 
those complaints and ensure correction of any problems found, and also 
enforce the legislative provisions to protect whistleblowers from any 
subsequent victimisation. This could be done either by a totally new 
authority, or by extending the jurisdiction of an existing authority such as 
the Ombudsman. For reasons which should become clear, I favour the 
latter approach. 
8 
PARTI 
THE PRESENT POSITION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS IN NEW ZEALAND 
A. The Problem of Whistleblowing 
1. The perceptions of employers 
If anyone ever compiled a "Thesaurus for Employers", the entry under 
''whistleblower'' would probably contain such synonyms as "troublemaker, 
meddler, busybody, snitch, sneak, telltale ... ". Those who publicly expose 
problems within their organisations are generally extremely unpopular 
with their superiors, and also with their colleagues. "Dobbing in" one's co-
workers is not part of the New Zealand workplace culture, whatever one's 
motives for doing it. 
However, employers also have more serious causes for concern about 
whistleblowing. Release of prejudicial information can significantly 
damage public confidence in an organisation. This has consequent effects 
on commercial interests, in the case of a private firm or state commercial 
entity. Disclosures of government mismanagement may be politically 
embarrassing, or can result, initially, in low morale among employees or in 
public perceptions of inefficiency.14 Employers therefore have an interest 
in keeping disclosures to a minimum, and trying to keep many matters out 
of the media in particular. 
However, not all employers are averse to having their employees free to 
speak out. Some, in my opinion justifiably, view it as good management 
practice to encourage as much openness as possible, and have strong 
internal complaints procedures to deal with aggrieved employees. Where 
other channels exist to air a complaint, and have it adequately dealt with, 
it becomes less likely that people will feel the need to blow the whistle to 
the world at large. 
14 I argue below, however, that whistleblowing will ultimately encourage higher standards of 
behaviour. This will then lead to greater pride in the organisation. Promoting openness in the 
public sector also enhances legitimacy. See below, Part III. 
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2. Suffering the slings and arrows - the whistleblowers 
Although not all employers victimise those who "spill the beans" about 
faulty practices, most whistleblowers are likely to suffer considerable 
retaliation for their actions. A recent study has been done in Australia by 
Dr Jean Lennane, a psychiatrist who was sacked from the NSW Health 
Department after questioning budget cuts. 15 All but one of the thirty-five 
respondents to her survey said that they had been victimised for speaking 
out about misconduct. The single exception had not been working for the 
organisation involved. 16 Dr Lennane's conclusions about the prevalence 
of victimisation have been supported by all the available literature about 
whistleblowers. 17 The risk of retributive action is recognised even by 
authorities who are not in favour of protection. 18 
The 'slings and arrows' take many forms, from the outrageous to the mild. 
Dr Lennane's study showed that almost half of her sample were pressured 
to resign, eight were dismissed and several were made redundant, 
pressured to take redundancy, or were transferred.19 As well as this, 
these people were subjected to "informal tactics" such as threat of legal or 
disciplinary action, personal isolation, abuse or denigration, forced 
psychiatric referral and removal of normal work. 20 The effect on many 
whistleblowers was devastating. Some suffered mental breakdown or 
15 Gay Alcorn "Doctor Fallout" Time November 29 1993, 30-31. 
16 K. Jean Lennane "'Whistleblowing': a health issue" (1993) 307 British Medical Joumal 667 
at 668. 
17 See, as a small sample, Clare Dyer "NHS whistleblower wants charter" (1992) 304 British 
Medical Joumal 203; Richard Fox "Protecting the Whistleblower" (1993) 15 Adelaide Law 
Review 137; Yvonne Cripps "Protection from adverse treatment by employers: a review of the 
positino of employees who disclose information in the belief that the disclosure is in the public 
interest" (1985) 101 LQR 506. 
18 Malcolm Dean "A gag on whistleblowing" (1992) 340 The Lancet 1277. The British Health 
Secretary recognised the problems that whistleblowers face. She reinstated a consultant 
haematologist, Dr Helen Zeitlin, who was made redundant after criticising health service charges. 
Yet her proposed guidelines to 'aid' whistleblowers in the National Health Service in fact will 
continue to penalise staff who make disclosures outside their organisation. 
19 Mr Pugmire was initially suspended, then offered a choice between dismissal or demotion to a 
clerical position on lower pay. See Pugmire, as above note 4. 
20 A detailed example is given by David Ewing "An Employee Bill of Rights" in Business Ethics 
above note 11, 241 at 242. The man in question revealed that his company was breaching 
environmental regulations. The action against him ranged from cancelling his place in the 
company car park to slashing his research budget. He eventually resigned and moved to another 
city. 
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difficulty in relationships, drastic loss of income and most had undergone 
a great deal of stress, with varying results. Two attempted suicide and ten 
others seriously considered it. A recent United States example vividly 
supports these conclusions. Roger Boisjoly, a chief engineer on the 
'Challenger project', repeatedly warned his superiors about defects in the 
space shuttle, but was ignored. After the disaster, he was "candid and 
outspoken at government hearings". The response was classic: 21 
... Boisjoly's bosses and many of his colleagues treated him like a pariah. 
Six months after the accident, no longer able to endure what he termed 
the "hostile" environment at Morton Thiokol, he left the company on 
extended sick leave. Eventually Boisjoly was diagnosed as having a post-
traumatic stress disorder and underwent two years of psychotherapy. 
He attributed the stress he suffered mainly to his treatment as a 
whistleblower, rather than being a result of the tragedy itself. 
Naturally, not all whistleblowers are angels. Some are, undoubtedly, true 
troublemakers who will be a thorn in the side of any organisation for which 
they work. These people will be probably be a rare exception, however. It 
is unlikely that many people will be prepared to put their careers and 
health on the line merely for the sake of causing disruption.22 
Whistleblower protection should aim to remove this disincentive to 
speaking out, while still giving no credit to troublemakers. 
B. Contracts and Confidences 
A variety of weapons are currently available to one wishing to challenge a 
whistleblower's actions. First, many informants are in breach of their 
employment contract, and if, as often happens, they are subjected to 
disciplinary action,23 they will not necessarily be able to win a personal 
21 Samuel C. Florman "Beyond whistleblowing: organizational changes can eliminate the need 
for corporate martyrdom" (1989) 92 Technology Review 20. 
22 At least, this is so as long as there is no financial reward available for whistleblowing. Some 
American states have legislation allowing whistleblowers to take an action on behalf of the 
government, and to claim a percentage of any damages awarded. This can amount to millions of 
dollars. Common sense indicates that this might encourage less than bona fide disclosures. 
Employers will also be keen to settle out of court to avoid a potentially reputation-shattering jury 
trial, even when there is no actual wrongdoing. 
23 This may take many forms, the most common of which are probably termination of 
employment, transferral or demotion. See above for details of other common reprisals. 
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grievance action. 24 Secondly, an employer may use legal actions such as 
those for defamation or for breach of confidence against employees who 
release information which is prejudicial to the employer. There is a 
defence to an action for breach of confidence that the information was 
disclosed in the public interest. However, the scope of the defence is not 
altogether clear, and not many potential whistleblowers are likely to risk 
relying on it. 
1. Breach of express contractual terms 
Many employment contracts contain an express clause prohibiting 
disclosure of information, or particular types of information, received 
during the course of the employment. This is frequently used by 
commercial bodies, to prevent revelation of trade secrets or highly 
commercially sensitive material. Public servants may also be under 
express obligations of secrecy, for instance in the areas of national 
security or patient confidentiality. However, it may be increasingly 
common to use express confidentiality clauses even where no material of 
a truly sensitive nature is involved. 25 Breach of such a clause, whatever 
one's motives for doing so, is a clear breach of contract, and the 
employee is then at risk of retaliatory action. 
Codes of conduct in particular fields of activity will also import certain 
terms into the employment contract. One example of this in New Zealand 
is the Public Service Code of Conduct, 26 which provides "the minimum 
standards of integrity and conduct for the Public Service. ''27 
Confidentiality is a major focus of the Code. For example, it refers to the 
need for discretion when making comments on policies with which a public 
24 In New Zealand, an employee under a contract of service can bring an action for a personal 
grievance under Part III of the Employment Contracts Act. Independent contractors cannot avail 
themselves of the provisions of the Act, however. The personal grievance provisions are included 
in Appendix B. 
25 This seems to be so in Britain, at least See Richard Smith "Whistleblowing: a curse on 
ineffective organisations" (1992) 305 British Medical Journal 1308-9. 
26 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct (SSC, Wellington, 1990). 
27 Ibid, page 7. 
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servant is involved. 28 A broader statement is also included about release 
of official information generally29 : 
It is unacceptable for public servants to make unauthorised use or 
disclosure of infonnation to which they have official access. Whatever 
their motives, such employees betray the trust put in them, and undennine 
the relationship that should exist between Ministers and the Public 
Service. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the unauthorised 
disclosure of infonnation may lead to disciplinary action, including 
dismissal. 
This is clearly a problem for potential whistleblowers in government 
departments. Health sector professionals also have a code of conduct 
which imposes strict confidentiality requirements. 
2. Implied terms of confidentiality 
Often, there is no express 'gagging clause', and no code of conduct which 
incorporates terms into the contract. However, an employee, whether in 
the public or private sector, is still subject to an implied term of 
confidentiality:30 
An employee has a duty not to disclose, during employment or after it has 
tenninated, any infonnation received in confidence during the course of 
the employment. Unlike the duty of fidelity, the duty not to disclose 
confidential infonnation survives the tennination of the contract of 
employment. 
Therefore, if a person indicates a wish to disclose information about an 
organisation, and is sacked for that, he or she would still be in breach of 
this implied term. It is, however, unclear what is meant by "information 
received in confidence during the course of the employment". To clarify 
this, one must look at the way in which issues of confidential material 
have been interpreted in the civil law action for breach of confidence. This 
is discussed below. 
The effect of breaching an express or implied term of confidentiality in an 
employment contract is that any subsequent dismissal might be said to be 
substantively justified. Unless there is some procedural impropriety in the 
28 Ibid, at page 13. 
29 Ibid, at page 17. 
30 Butterworths Employment Law Guide (Butterworths, Wellington, 1993) 517. 
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manner of the dismissal,31 the employee may therefore not be able to 
obtain a remedy under the personal grievance provisions of the 
Employment Contracts Act.32 It may be that proof that the disclosure was 
in the public interest will provide the employee with an excuse for breach 
of contract, so as to render a dismissal unjustifiable, although this is 
rather unclear.33 Alternatively, a public interest in disclosure of 
information could be said to mean that the information is not truly 
confidential at all. Therefore, there would be no breach of contract. At 
common law, however, public interest clearly goes to a defence, rather 
than being an element of confidentiality itself. 
If the employer takes detrimental action other than dismissal, the 
employee may bring a personal grievance claim under section 27(1 )(b) 
that the employer has acted unjustifiably and has thereby affected the 
employee's employment to his or her disadvantage. It appears, however, 
that the grievance has to relate to a breach of a contractual obligation on 
the part of the employer. 34 Unless the employee can show that, because 
the disclosure was in the public interest, the employer's actions were 
therefore unjustified, and amounted to a breach of contract, this ground of 
action will probably fail. Employees who breach their employment 
contracts by disclosing information therefore have few defences in 
employment law against retributive action. 35 
31 For example, a warning is required in situations other than where summary di
smissal is 
justified. The employer also has the obligation to investigate the alleged wrongdoin
g thoroughly, 
and to conduct a hearing with the employee being given a chance to state his or her c
ase. 
32 Section 27 (1) (a). See Appendix B. 
33 New Zealand Air Line Pilots' Association v Air New Zealand Ltd [1992] 1 ERNZ 353 at 36
0 
(CA). The case allows (obiter) that senior staff may have an "overriding public duty to di
sclose 
serious doubts about the safety of an aircraft" in "an extreme case, and as a last reso
rt" . This was 
a case where damages were claimed, however, not a dismissal incident. 
34 Employment Law Guide as above note 30, at 71; Alliance Freezing Co (South/and) 
Ltd v NZ 
Engineering Union [1990] ILB 18, (1990) 3 NZELC 97,328. 
35 Moreover, if the revelations are made, for example, to a newspaper, which then pub
lishes the 
story, the employer may also have a cause of action against the newspaper for in
ducement to 
breach of contract, and can claim compensatory damages for any economic 
loss caused. 
Employment Law Guide as above note 30, page 530. This cause of action is apparently becomi
ng 
increasingly common. 
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3. Breach of confidence 
As well as asserting an ability to dismiss, or otherwise sanction an 
employee, the employer may also bring a separate legal action for breach 
of confidence. 36 This may be necessary if an employer wishes to get 
injunctive relief to prevent publication of the information, or to have 
documents returned, or if compensatory damages are requested. 
To sustain the action, the employer must show that the information 
disclosed has "the necessary quality of confidence" about it. While clearly 
covering such things as trade secrets, the term does not extend to cover 
all information received in the course of work. The disclosure must also 
occur in "circumstances importing an obligation of confidence".
37 It is 
necessary too for a plaintiff to show that unauthorised use has 
subsequently been made of the confidential material. 
38 What is 
considered confidential will depend entirely upon the facts of each case. 
Some of the factors involved are:39 
a) the nature of the employment (whether confidential material is 
habitually handled); 
b) the nature of the information itself (a trade secret or something 
equally deserving of protection); 
c) whether the employer told the employee the information was 
confidential; 
36 Other possible legal actions here include defamation, breach of copyright and breach of 
fiduciary duty. A public interest defence is probably available in some form for all of these. One
 
should also note the existence of various statutory obligations of confidentiality. One of the most 
far-reaching of these is the Privacy Act 1993. Information privacy principle 11 restricts disclosure 
of personal information held about another to very limited circumstances. 
37 Ibid, at page 519-520. The tests are given in Thomas Marshall Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227, 
and Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1989] Ch 117. 
38 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41, approved by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal inAB Consolidated Ltdv Europe Strength Food Co Ply Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 515. 
39 These guidelines were adopted in Korbond Industries Ltd v Jenkins and Anor [1992] 1 ERNZ 
1141, from the list given in Faccenda Chicken, above note 16. See also Susan Singleton 
"Employee Mobility and Confidential Information" [1992] NLJ 1419. 
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d) whether the information can easily be isolated from other 
material which the employee would be free to disclose. 
4. The Hpublic interest" defence to breach of confidence 
Whistleblower legislation would provide New Zealand whistleblowers with 
protection from civil action as a result of their public interest disclosures.
40 
At common law, a whistleblower may already have a defence to a breach 
of confidence, if the court is satisfied that the disclosure was in the public 
interest. The defence originated with the case of Gartside v Outram, which 
stated that "there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity".
41 This 
clearly covers such extremes as disclosure of illegal acts,
42 but the word 
"iniquity" is perhaps too vague to be helpful. 
The leading case establishing the public interest defence is Initial 
Services v Putteri/1. 43 A sales manager of the plaintiff laundering company 
resigned, taking with him documentation of an unregistered (and therefore 
illegal) pricing ring, as well as other problems with the firm's management. 
He gave the documents to a national newspaper, which published the 
story. Using reasoning which seems to reflect general ideas in 
whistleblowing, Lord Denning stated the rule as follows: 44 
[The exception to the duty of confidentiality] ... extends to any misconduct 
of such a nature that it ought in the public interest to be disclosed to 
others .... The exception should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, 
both those actually committed as well as those in contemplation, provided 
always - and this is essential - that the disclosure is justified in the public 
interest. The reason is because 'no private obligations can dispense with 
that universal one which lies on every member of society to discover 
every design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of the society, to 
destroy the public welfare'45 
40 Whistleblowers Protection Bill, clause 7. This would give whistleblowers immunity from 
criminal or civil action in relation to making a disclosure of public interest information. 
41 (1857) 26 LJ Ch 113, 114. 
42 The case of Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1919] 1 KB 520 even attempted to restrict the 
"iniquity" even here to proposed illegal actions, but not to acts which had already been
 
committed. Bankes Lrs concern (at page 527) was to preserve such institutions as solicitor/client, 
or doctor/patient confidentality. However, this interpretation of the Gartside doctrine has been
 
overruled as being too narrow, in Initial Services v Putteri/1 [1968] lQB 396. 
43 See above note 42. 
44 Initial Services, as above note 42, at 405. 
45 Annesley v (Earl) Anglesea (17430 LR 5 QB 317. 
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The public interest defence has been adopted in New Zealand.
46 A 
whistleblower might well, at present, be able to establish this defence if an 
action for breach of confidence were brought. 
However, the cases are not always totally clear on which types of 
disclosures are, in fact, justified in the public interest. To cite two 
extremes, in Woodward v Hutchins, 47 the court allowed publication of 
highly personal information about the singer Tom Jones, on the basis that 
the public had a right to know that the reality of his life was different from 
his public image. Yet the 'British Steel mole' case48 seemed to take a 
much more limited approach to public interest information. Grenada 
Television made a documentary alleging serious financial 
mismanagement within British Steel, a public corporation. It made 
substantial use of damaging and highly confidential information, which 
had been leaked by an unnamed member of British Steel management. 
The company brought an action against Grenada to make it disclose the 
name of the source so that it could discipline the employee. The question 
of confidentiality was discussed in general. Although Lord Wilberforce 
suggested that where publication of confidential material may be justified 
where there is misconduct to report, the House of Lords decided that 
there was no misconduct on the part of British Steel here. "Wrongdoing" 
was construed narrowly, and excluded the mismanagement of a public 
corporation which resulted in huge financial loss. A potential 
whistleblower will find it hard to discover what aspects of wrongdoing will 
be covered under the common law defence and therefore how great her 
risk of liability is. 
The success of the defence could also rest on whether the information is 
given to "one who has a proper interest to receive it".49 In Initial Services, 
Lord Denning made it plain that reporting a crime to the police, or breach 
of a statute to the appropriate watchdog authority was within the scope of 
46 Attorney-Genera/for the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1988] I NZLR 129 
at 176 (the Spycatcher litigation) approved the defence, although without specific reference to 
any of the English cases. The recent "winebox papers" case of European Pacific Banking 
Corporation v Fourth Estate Publications Ltd [1993] I NZLR 559 at 563-4, however, did apply 
the English cases. 
47 [1977] 2 All ER 751. 
48 British Steel Corporation Ltdv Granada Television Ltd (1981] AC 1096. 
49 Initial Services, above note 42, 405. 
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the defence. So, in New Zealand, a whistleblower could probably give 
confidential information to the Ombudsman50 about mismanagement of 
funds in a State Owned Enterprise, for example, and feel secure that he 
or she would have a defence to any allegations of breach of confidence. 
51 
However, problems may occur if there is no obviously appropriate 
authority to which to turn. Frustration may also arise for an informant 
when he or she reports a matter to a proper authority, and nothing is 
done, or there appears to be a cover-up. At this stage, many people 
choose to turn to the media. 52 
Lord Denning was prepared to allow that the media have a role to play in 
publicising serious misconduct. He said ''There may be cases where the 
misdeed is of such a character that the public interest may demand, or at 
least excuse, publication on a broader field, even to the press. "
53 Indeed, 
the cases in this area almost invariably involve publication in the news 
media. Lord Denning's view is forcefully supported by Stephenson LJ in 
Uon Laboratories v Evans. 54 He states that there is some confidential 
information which it will be in the public interest to be made known, and 
which the press has a right to receive and publish, even if it was 
unlawfully obtained in flagrant breach of confidence. 55 Again, however, 
the parameters of the defence are unclear here. The test from Uon 
Laboratories is one of balancing the public interest in maintaining 
confidences against the public interest in disclosing this particular 
information. This pragmatic approach seems to have been adopted in 
so For details of the role of the Ombudsman with whistleblowers, see below, Part N. 
SI It should be noted, however, that this will not necessarily protect a whistleblower from 
dismissal or other retributive action for breach of the employment contract. A separate personal 
grievance action in the Employment Court would still be required. 
s2 For example, a former Defence force employee, who had been stationed at the Linton army 
camp, told "Morning Report" (National Radio, 16 September 1994) that allegations of 
misappropriation of funds had first been made about three years previously, yet nothing had been 
done. This was why he was speaking out now. 
s3 Initial Services, above note 42 at page 406. 
s4 [1984] 3 WLR 539. 
ss Lion Laboratories concerned disclosure of information from a senior technician, who knew 
that a new and widely-used breath-testing device (the Intoximeter) was highly unreliable in its 
measurement of alcohol. A considerable number of potential convictions hinged on the device. 
The story was published in the papers, to the detriment of the British manufacturer. Although the 
material was admitted to be highly confidential, the Court of Appeal decided that the disclosure 
was in the public interest because of the high risk of false convictions from use of the machine. 
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New Zealand. 56 This would seem to be the fairest way for a court to 
approach the issue, but it does not give very clear guidelines to potential 
whistleblowers. There is substantial risk involved. 
The motives of the defendant in disclosing the information may also be 
relevant to the defence. Lord Denning, in Initial Services, indicated (obiter) 
that the defence may not be available if the informant acted out of malice 
or spite, or for reward. "It is a great evil when people purvey scandalous 
information for reward". 57 An informant who genuinely believes that the 
material is true, however, should surely be entitled to the defence. The 
public interest lies in the disclosure of that particular information, not in 
the motives of the informant. Stephenson LJ, in Uon Laboratories, was 
clearly uninterested in whether the informant had received payment from 
the newspaper for the story. He focused instead on the risk of false 
convictions because of the faulty breath testing device. 58
 Clearly, there 
can be no public interest in the dissemination of lies. But, short of this, the 
public interest defence should not automatically be ruled out. 
5. The role of trade unions 
Trade unions have probably had a significant role to play in the protection 
of workplace standards and the exposure and rectification of wrongdoing. 
A reasonably powerful union may have had a chance to encourage an 
employer to alter unacceptable practices, such as those which might 
constitute a danger to public health. Unions are also not directly subject to 
contractual obligations of confidentiality. Therefore, it could be that a 
union would be in a position to publicly expose wrongdoing, in 
government and elsewhere, while preserving the anonymity of their 
whistleblowing member. 59 
56 The European Pacific case frames its test in these terms. See above note 46, at 564. 
57 See above note 42 at 406. 
58 Lord Denning himself, in Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 seemed quite unconcerned by the 
fact that the defendant was making money from the publication of his book, which contained 
confidential material. The public interest lay in revealing the 'dangerous nature' of Scientology 
practices. 
59 The submissions of the Australian Public Service Union to the Senate Select Committee on 
Whistleblowing suggests that this is so. See Submissions 30 November 1993. 
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Should that anonymity be breached, and the whistleblower subjected to 
workplace harassment, a trade union would also be able to provide 
support and some measure of protection. A union could take a case to 
court on a member's behalf, and might cover at least part of the court 
costs. It could also act as a whistleblower's media spokesperson, thus 
taking the pressure off the individual informant to a large degree. The 
effectiveness of a union in this regard can be seen from the experiences 
of Neil Pugmire, who was lucky enough to have the backing of the Public 
Service Association. 
However, recent alterations in industrial law in New Zealand have 
arguably reduced the powers of trade unions significantly. It appears as if 
membership has fallen, and many unions have disappeared. Those which 
remain have been at least partially emasculated by the provisions of the 
Employment Contracts Act. The increased tendency to contract out work 
in government probably means that much government work is being 
directed to non-unionised organisations. The protection which was 
probably previously available to whistleblowers through their unions has 
therefore been greatly reduced. Potential informants are likely to be 
deterred to a far greater extent if they think they have to act alone. The 
removal of this area of protection from many whistleblowers therefore 
increases the need for some more formal type of whistleblower protection. 
C. Present and potential protection for whistleblowers 
At present, there are many different remedies which a whistleblower may 
have against an employer. A public servant may complain to the 
Ombudsman about decisions made within the department, including 
employment decisions. A public or private sector employee who is sacked 
may bring an action in the Employment Courts for unjustified dismissal. It 
may be shown that the employee's right to freedom of expression under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act has been breached, and in the wake of 
the Baigent case, the whistleblower may be entitled to damages from an 
offending public authority. If sued for breach of confidence, he or she may 
claim the defence of disclosure in the public interest. Yet, with all these 
apparent protections available, people still suffer as a result of revealing 
information about their employers. Since the risks and stresses are so 
high, people will generally avoid trouble, and keep information to 
themselves. 
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It may be possible to amend the present law to aid whistleblowers, without 
the necessity for separate legislative provisions and a statutory authority 
to deal with the problem. Various improvements could be made. For 
example, the scope of the public interest defence to an action for breach 
of confidence could be legislatively clarified. 60 However, even if this 
happened, there is unlikely to be a great increase in the incidence of 
whistleblowing. The defence can only come into play once an informant is 
being sued for breach of confidence. Most people will be unwilling to 
undergo the stress involved of having to defend a court action in this way. 
It also does not deal with the problem of inevitable loss of employment. 
In addition, disclosure of public interest information could be specifically 
incorporated into the Employment Contracts Act. One ground for asserting 
a personal grievance is that of discrimination. 61 It would be a relatively 
small matter to include disclosure of public interest information among the 
categories of prohibited discrimination which are already listed. However, 
this again would aid whistleblowers only to a small extent. Many 
informants would not be covered by the Act, because they are 
independent contractors. This is a particular concern given the recent 
trends towards contracting out government service provision. Many 
people who do work for the government, and who are therefore in a 
unique position to know what is going on with government money, are not 
public employees but independent contractors. Also, even if an informant 
is covered by the Act, and could claim the benefit of the personal 
grievance provisions, this does not protect him or her against job loss or 
other retributive action in the first place. Again, the strain of having to fight 
a court battle with one's employer should be avoided if at all possible. As 
Brown and McKenna say, ''The problems of the common law in this area 
are evident: protection is only retrospective and what an employee needs 
most is on-the-job protection. "62 
60 See G Gunasekara "Legislation to Protect Whistleblowers: is the proposed solution just what 
the doctor ordered or is it too blunt an instrument?" [1994] NZLJ 303. 
61 Section 27 (1) (c). The heads of prohibited discrimination are set out in section 28 (1). See 
Appendix B. 
62 Damian Brown and Bronwyn McKenna "Protecting 'whistleblowers' from victimisation" 
Solicitors Journal. 
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One further possibility is to expand the definition of discrimination in the 
Human Rights Act 1993 itself to cover instances of retaliation against 
whistleblowers. The Human Rights Commission has well-established 
advisory and counselling procedures,63 but can also make judicial 
determinations and award substantive remedies. However, there are two 
problems with using this method of protection. 
First, the Commission is presently overworked. This could result in some 
delay in processing claims, which will not give whistleblowers much 
confidence in the new system. Secondly, and more importantly, however, 
the focus of whistleblower protection is not on the discrimination itself. 
Protecting employees from retaliation is a means to an end. The real 
emphasis lies on the public interest information which is revealed. The 
initial allegations of wrongdoing must be investigated and remedied, and 
the Commission is not the body to do that. Effectively, the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill in clause 29 (3) seems to envisage a partnership between 
the investigating Authority and the Commission as the agency which 
enforces the anti-victimisation provisions. This is sensible, but separate 
legislation is needed to constitute that Authority. To spare whistleblowers 
from confusion, a single easily identifiable authority should, where 
possible, have ultimate control over the case and the Commission cannot 
fulfil that role. 
There may, therefore, be justification for adding to the statute-book by 
creating whistleblower legislation, and for allocating substantial 
government resources to whichever agency is chosen to deal with 
whistleblower complaints. The party with the most protection at present 
under the law is the employer organisation. Whistleblowers have limited 
protection, but the risks are too high for many to be prepared to make a 
stand. The public interest also is largely ignored, in favour of private rights 
to control employees, and to keep information confidential which would be 
better disclosed. If disclosures are to be encouraged, bona tide informants 
must be guaranteed the maximum possible protection from retribution. 
What types of disclosures should be covered, in the light of overseas 
legislative models, is the subject of the next section. 
63 Avoidance of adversarial procedures is also seen as desirable in the Whistleblowers Protection 
Bill (NZ); see, for example, clause 20. However, where this is not possible, the procedures under 
the Human Rights Act are to be used (clauses 29, 31). 
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PART/I 
PROTECTED DISCLOSURES - SOME OVERSEAS MODELS 
Opponents of whistleblowing legislation often see protective measures as 
encouraging the disclosure of all types of information, including malicious 
revelations of trivial material. Disgruntled employees, they say, could 
make a serious nuisance of themselves by prosecuting numerous minor 
complaints, and employers would be powerless to dismiss, or otherwise 
discipline them. Costs would increase and administrative efficiency would 
be drastically impaired. 
If whistleblower protection indeed covered any type of disclosure, this 
might well be true. However, no overseas whistleblowing legislation has 
created a general outlet for complaints, and nor does New Zealand's 
proposed legislation. Only those complaints which concern matters of 
serious public importance qualify the informant for legislative protection 
from victimisation. The reasoning behind the legislative provisions may be 
very similar to that behind the public interest defence to breach of 
confidence. However, legislation can state more explicitly those matters 
which are said to be in the public interest, and leaves less room for totally 
different interpretations in the courts. This chapter will discuss what types 
of disclosures should be covered by legislation in New Zealand. It is 
useful to look overseas for some guidance on this issue. 64 
A. The Level of Interest Overseas 
The concept of protecting whistleblowers is one which has taken firm root 
in many Western countries. The development is a very recent one; most 
of the debate and introduction of legislation has taken place in the last 
five years, with the exception of the limited protection offered by the Civil 
Service Reform Act in the USA as early as 1978. This Act was amended 
and extended in 1989 by the Whistleblowers Protection Act. Almost three 
quarters of the states in the USA also have whistleblower statutes. These 
are of very varying coverage and quality. 
64 It is significant that the tendency is to define particular types of disclosure rather than the tenn 
"whistleblower". Emphasising the information itself, rather than the informant makes it clear that 
protection of the informant is not a public good in itself but rather a means to an end. 
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Australia also has legislation in place. South Australia has the 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993, the Australian Capital Territory has 
whistleblower provisions incorporated in its Public Administration Act, and 
Queensland introduced interim legislation in 1990, with a new statute 
planned for this year. 65 
Legislation is under consideration elsewhere. The Protected Disclosures 
Bill is before the New South Wales Parliament. The Australian Senate 
Select Committee on Public Interest Whistleblowing recently reported 
back, recommending that federal whistleblower legislation should be put 
in place. One of the models that they considered was a Private Member's 
Bill introduced by Senator Chamarette. In Canada, a Private Member's Bill 
on whistleblowing had its first reading in May of this year. Finally, there is 
our own Whistleblowers Protection Bill, again a Private Member's Bill, 
introduced by Hon Phil Goff. The Justice and Law Reform Select 
Committee will be considering the Bill fairly soon.66 
The "odd country out" in the list is, of course, Britain. The reason for this 
is undoubtedly that the existence of the Official Secrets Act creates a very 
different mentality in government. The official focus tends to be on 
secrecy rather than openness, on maintaining confidence at all costs 
rather than on acknowledging a public interest in the disclosure of some 
types of information. 67 The existence of the defence to breach of 
confidence mitigates the severity of this to a certain extent, but, as we 
have seen, it cannot be regarded as a panacea. However, even in Britain, 
there has been a good deal of debate about this subject. Most of the 
British literature which I have encountered has tended to focus more on 
the problems faced by individual whistleblowers in their employment than 
on any theoretical justifications for encouraging particular types of 
disclosures, however. This would seem to be a product of the different 
prevailing mentality. 
65 The Whistleblowers (Interim Protection) and Miscellaneous Amendments Act (Qu
eensland). 
It was decided that immediate measures were necessary to tackle the need for wh
istleblowing. 
Premier Goss announced on 10 April 1994 that a new statute was to be drafted this y
ear, covering 
both public and private sectors. 
66 There is, as yet, no clear indication from the Clerk of Committees when the hea
rings will 
commence. 
67 This is evidenced by the extensive Spycatcher litigation, eg Attorney-General v Obse
rver Ltd 
and Ors [1988] 3 WLR 776. 
LAV Ll8R,4-SY 
VTCTORIA u~~IVERSITY OF WEl Ur.JGTOll' 
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B. Public or Private Sector Coverage 
One of the first questions to ask when assessing what types of 
disclosures to encourage is what source they should come from. Should 
legislation cover only public service employees, or should protection 
extend to those in the private sector? 
Overseas models have addressed this issue in a variety of ways. The 
United States legislation provides protection only for federal employees, 
68 
and the draft legislation in New South Wales and, apparently, Canada, 
also limits coverage to public service whistleblowers.69 Alternatively, 
legislation may cover private sector employees whose organisations are 
involved with use of public funds. The reasoning behind the restricted 
coverage is not made explicit. However, the basis would seem to be that 
the focus is on countering corruption and misuse of public funds. 
Legislation is clearly justified by principles of openness and accountability 
of government. 
In contrast, the South Australian legislation, on which the provisions of the 
New Zealand Bill are modelled, covers both private and public sectors. Its 
application to the private sector is, however, limited. The purpose of the 
Act is "to facilitate the disclosure, in the public interest, of 
maladministration and waste in the public sector and of corrupt or illegal 
conduct generally."70 These concerns are mirrored in clause 5(1) of the 
New Zealand Bill, but the application to the private sector is not limited to 
conduct which can be described as corrupt or illegal. Public interest 
information is defined as "information which relates to any conduct or 
activity, whether in the public sector or in the private sector ... " which falls 
into particular categories. 11 
68 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989, section 2. 
69 The reason for my tentative phrasing as regards the Canadian Bill is that, on the wording of 
the amendment to the Canadian Human Rights Act (clause 1), it looks as if the new 
discriminatory practice of retaliating against whistleblowers applies generally. The explanatory 
notes, however, refer to the purpose of the Bill as being "to provide appropriate sanctions against 
retaliatory discharges by public sector employers of employees who report or "blow the whistle" 
on serious misconduct of their employers." It is unclear whether "employees" refers only to public 
servants, or whether it would cover private sector contractors working for the government. 
70 Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993, section 3. 
71 See Appendix A. 
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The application of the legislation to both public and private sectors would 
seem to make practical sense. Much government work is now done 
outside the core public sector, so private organisations are frequently 
involved with work using public funds. Attempting to frame legislation to 
cover only the public service, but to catch also these types of situations, 
can lead to somewhat convoluted drafting. 72 It is simpler to cover both 
sectors, but ensure that interference with the private sector only occurs in 
fairly extreme instances. For example, there are certain matters of 
fundamental public importance, such as public health and safety issues, 
which may arise as a result of the behaviour of organisations in either 
sector. 
Also, and perhaps most fundamentally, the line between public and 
private is becoming increasingly blurred. This is reflected in current 
attitudes to public and administrative law, where a private entity may find 
itself subject to traditionally public law actions. It is also shown in 
employment law, which treats the employment of the individual on the 
same principles of contract, whatever the status of the employer as 
private or public sector.73 It may simply be too unhelpful to refer to 
"public" and "private" sectors where matters of public interest information 
are in issue. 
C. Categories of Public Interest Information 
All the examples of legislation considered have attempted to formulate 
with reasonable precision what categories of information should be 
deemed to be of public interest. All cover illegal activity and unauthorised 
use or mismanagement of public funds. The wording varies, but the 
sentiments are the same. Corruption and other breaches of law are a 
clear target. 74 
72 This is reflected in Senator Charnarette's Bill (Australia), in clause 4. "Where a person or body 
is engaged as a consultant to, or to provide services for, a part of the federal public service, tha
t 
person or body shall, while doing an act for the purposes of, or in connection with, the
 
performance of functions as consultant or the provision of those services, as the case may be, be
 
deemed to be employed in the federal public service." 
73 The Privacy Act 1993 supplies another precedent for legislation which applies to both sectors 
here. It appears to operate cornf ortably within that framework despite initial objections. 
74 For example, the South Australian Act defines public interest information, in section 4, as 
"information that tends to show [a person etc] has been involved in illegal activity, irregular and
 
unauthorised use of public money, or a substantial mismanagement of public resources ... " The
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Some provisions also refer to "maladministration" by public officials. This 
can be defined in a number of ways. The South Australian legislation 
makes it plain that maladministration includes impropriety or negligence.
75 
The New South Wales proposals are arguably wider. Maladministration is 
conduct which involves "action or inaction of a serious nature that is (a) 
contrary to law; or (b) unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory; or (c) based wholly or partly on improper motives."
76 (my 
emphasis). In contrast, maladministration as such is omitted from the 
definition of public interest information in the New Zealand Bill. 
77 This 
appears to be a significant error. There may be categories of seriously 
unacceptable behaviour in government which may not fit under the 
headings of unlawfulness, corruption, unauthorised use of public funds or 
resources and so on. Disclosures about such behaviour should be 
covered by the legislation, to encourage the improvement of management 
practices in these areas. 
Conduct which poses a significant threat to public health or safety is 
almost invariably something which attracts protection for disclosure.
78 
This would cover the Neil Pugmire type of situation. The New Zealand Bill, 
however, also follows the South Australian Act in that disclosures about 
the environment are included. This coverage is unusual, perhaps because 
of its very wide implications for the private sector. The degree of alleged 
injury is different in the two statutes, however. "Substantial risk" to the 
environment is required by South Australia79 , but it is sufficient under our 
proposals that something is "injurious" to the environment. As long as the 
complaint is not of a trivial or vexatious nature, it would be investigated. 
80 
Canadian Bill is more equivocal, but the effect is probably the same. Clause 2 refer
s to conduct 
which is "illegal or contrary to public policy". 
7s Section 4, under the definition of "maladministration". 
76 Clause 11(2). 
77 See Appendix A at Clause 5. 
78 The US Whistleblowers Protection Act refers to "a substantial and specific danger 
to public 
health or safety"; the South Australian Act also talks of "substantial risk to publ
ic health or 
safety". The New Zealand Bill covers conduct which is a significant risk or danger, o
r is injurious 
to public health or public safety. The Canadian Bill does not include a requirement
 of degree of 
risk. The odd one out here is the NSW Protected Disclosures Bill, which does not cov
er this issue 
at all. 
79 Section 4, under the definition of "public interest information". 
80 See clause 22, Appendix A. 
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I believe that our lower threshhold for 'misconduct' in this field will cause 
difficulties and should be elevated to the same standard as South 
Australia. This will be the major area of impact on private sector activities, 
and is in some ways the most difficult area to justify although the 
environment is indisputably a matter of great significance to the public. 
Clear breaches of law would already be covered under the heading of 
illegality, but one has to take care if extending encouragement of 
reporting beyond that. Definitions of environmental damage are, for a 
start, not that easy to come by. Perceptions of harm can be extremely 
subjective, depending on one's particular concerns. There are also 
commercial concerns at stake. It can take quite some time to improve 
standards, even where there is good will to do so in an organisation. 
Revelation of breaches of environmental standards in the interim could be 
extremely commercially damaging. This might be mitigated by having 
revelations made only to an independent authority which will maintain a 
certain level of confidentiality. Such an authority could keep tabs on what 
is going on in an organisation, and make sure that improvements are put 
in place as and when possible, while at the same time not damaging 
commercial interests unjustifiably. However, organisations will still be 
defensive if employees can report them for relatively minor environmental 
concerns. This could lead not so much to an improvement in conduct, as 
to a veil of secrecy within organisations, and an entirely counterproductive 
atmosphere of suspicion. 
D. The Requirement of Good Faith 
Although legislation tends to define what types of conduct will be the 
subject of a protected disclosure, rather than focus on the informant, the 
conduct of the whistleblower is important in one respect. If a whistleblower 
is to receive protection from victimisation at work for making the 
disclosure, that disclosure must be made in good faith. 
This is not, however, just an extension of the "clean hands" principle. The 
actual motivations of the employee are in many ways irrelevant. A 
disgruntled employee who "turns Queen's Evidence", as it were, and 
reveals information about a matter which is clearly of public interest (as 
defined above), should be entitled to protection from victimisation which 
occurs purely as a result of that disclosure. If such information is to be 
encouraged, detailed enquiries into the motivations of employees will be 
counterproductive. 
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However, it cannot be said to be in the public interest to encourage 
people to tell lies in the hope of asserting some form of protection in their 
employment. Therefore, legislation usually excludes from protection those 
people who produce false information knowing that it is false, or without 
reasonable grounds to believe that it might be true. 81 This is what is 
generally referred to as acting in good faith in this area. 
E. Conclusions 
The level of activity overseas on whistleblower protection seems to 
indicate that this is an idea whose time has come. There are certain types 
of information which, in principle, it is in the public interest to reveal. 
Encouragement of such disclosures will not occur unless on-the-job 
protection is given to informants. 
Any New Zealand legislation should, however, not simply be a knee-jerk 
reaction to one or two well-publicised cases here and a feeling of being 
left behind in the rush to enact legislation overseas. If legislation is to be 
introduced here, and especially if an expensive new authority is to be 
created or significant changes made to an existing one, whistleblower 
protection needs to be justified in terms of constitutional principles, recent 
changes in government and practical considerations. In the next section, I 
propose to show that encouragement of whistleblowers is a natural 
extension of several firmly established principles of New Zealand 
government and ideas of public interest. 
81 Whistleblower Protection Act (South Australia) clause 5(2); Canadian Bill clause 2 and 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1989 (USA) #1213 both refer to reasonable belief; Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill (NZ) mirrors exactly the SA Act. 
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PART Ill 
A CASE FOR WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
A. Constitutional Principles 
1. Open government 
Since the Official Information Act was passed in 1982, principles of open 
government have been at the heart of the New Zealand government 
system. As the Danks Report stated, there is a compelling case for having 
open government as opposed to a regime of 'official secrets':82 
It [the case) rests on the democratic principles of encouraging participation 
in public affairs and ensuring the accountability of those in office; it also 
derives from concern for the interests of individuals. A no less important 
consideration is that the Government requires public understanding and 
support to get its policies carried out. This can come only from an 
inf armed public. 
It is vital, therefore, that the public should be able to scrutinise and be 
informed about government decision-making to a significant degree. Such 
openness leads to an increase in public confidence in the system, and 
keeps decision-makers on their toes. It enhances legitimacy, creating 
overtly higher standards, and making the governed more willing to be 
governed. As Sir Kenneth Keith has said:83 
Information is made available for some purposes, as Parliament in the 
Official lnformation Act ... also stress(es), to allow public participation in 
policy making, to enhance the accountability of those exercising public 
power, to explain decisions and policies, to help correct them ... 
Once this was recognised, various structural changes were implemented 
to give effect to the principles of open government. The immediate result 
of the Danks Report was the passing of the Official Information Act 1982 
[the OIA] itself. This creates the presumption that government information 
will be available to those who request it.84 The office of the Ombudsman, 
which preceded the OIA by seven years, was given an extended 
jurisdiction to investigate complaints about access to official information. 
82 The Committee on Official Information (chaired by Sir Alan Danks) Towards Open 
Government (Government Printer, Wellington, 1981) 14. 
83 KJ Keith "Open Government in New Zealand" (1987) 17 VUWLR 333 at 343. 
84 Section 5 Official Information Act. 
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The Ombudsman therefore provides the public with an easily-accessible 
avenue for scrutiny of executive action. 
Later reforms are based on the same principles. These include the 
extension of the Select Committee process in 1987 to allow greater public 
participation, the creation of the Regulations Review Committee and 
increasing requirements that departments undertake substantial public 
consultation before making major decisions. This is particularly so in the 
areas of environmental policy and Maori affairs. 
2. Withholding information 
Open government, however, does not mean that all official information 
should be available to the public, and that we should be able to 
participate in every stage of the decision-making process. The public 
interest in participation must be balanced against the need (also in the 
public interest) for government to function smoothly and efficiently, for 
policies to be formed and goals achieved. The Official Information Act 
itself provides exceptions to the principle of availability, which address 
this need for efficient government. 65 
Other interests are also at stake beside that of administrative efficiency. 
Frequently, official information is also, at least partly, personal 
information, that is, information about an identifiable individual. Privacy 
concerns mean that that information should not be made available to 
anyone other than the person to whom it refers. Maintenance of personal 
privacy is also a matter of public interest, as a basic human right. The OIA 
addresses this concern by allowing information to be withheld if it is 
personal information86 . Complaints over refusal to release official 
information for any reason, including that it is personal information, may 
be referred to the Ombudsman, who can investigate it without jeopardising 
the privacy of any party involved. The Privacy Act 1993 also provides that 
personal information shall not be disclosed, with some exceptions. 87 It is 
85 These exceptions are contained in ss 6-9 of the Act. 
86 Section 9 (2)(a). 
87 See Information privacy principle 11 , and the exceptions to it. 
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worth noting, however, that the information privacy principles do not apply 
to the news media, in relation to their news activities. 88 
Some exceptions to the principle of availability of official information are 
therefore fully justified, but they should not be made wider than is 
absolutely necessary. Nobody would claim that the system is perfect. 
Much information remains hidden without good cause. Ingenious record-
keeping, or failure to keep full records are widespread practices.89 In such 
circumstances, maladministration may not be easily brought to light. Full 
compliance with the Official Information regime is, no doubt, 
adminstratively awkward, but this is justified in the wider public interest.
90 
Allowing employees to come forward and expose performance which is 
significantly unsatisfactory (in terms of the discussion in Part II), might, 
therefore, be one way of filling in some of the gaps in knowledge about 
government activities or, at least, in lessening people's perceptions that 
there is something fishy going on. This should not be perceived as a 
threat to the integrity of the system. Increased accountability to the public, 
either directly, or through a watchdog such as the Ombudsman, should 
lead to higher standards in the way the state is administered. This in turn 
will ultimately lead to greater confidence, and greater legitimacy. 
3. Bill of Rights Act 
Section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act [BORA] states that 
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom 
to seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind in any 
form." In the case of whistleblowers, this right may be breached in a 
variety of ways. A public servant who is dismissed as a result of revealing 
information about his or her department is being punished for exercising 
the right of free speech. The harassment of whistleblowers may be 
calculated as a deterrent to other potential informants, preventing them 
from exercising the right. 
88 The news media are excluded from the definition of "agency" in section 2. 
89 At least, my discussions with various friends in the public service indicate that this is so. 
90 See RW Cole "The Public Sector: The Conflict Between Accountability and Efficiency" (1988) 
47 Australian Journal of Public Administration 223 . 
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Freedom of speech also captures the idea of the public's right to know 
what is going on.91 This issue is, of course, at the heart of the debate on 
whistleblowing. Some types of information should not be allowed to 
remain hidden; encouraging whistleblowers could ensure that the public 
(or a neutral, independent authority as agent of the public) becomes 
aware of the problem. Prima facie, therefore, the penalties suffered by 
many whistleblowers in New Zealand at present would seem to indicate 
breaches of the Bill of Rights. 
The right of freedom of expression, in the absence of any clearly 
inconsistent enactment, 92 is subject only to such limitations as are 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 93 Our free and 
democratic society, as noted above, has at its heart the principle of open 
government. This principle clearly supports the right of people to speak 
out about and actively participate in official matters, and for the public to 
know as much as possible about what is happening in government. Open 
government and the Bill of Rights are therefore complementary. 
Public authorities will have to be extremely careful what limitations they 
seek to impose upon their employees' freedom to speak out. General 
gagging clauses in employment contracts may well be in breach of the Bill 
of Rights. Such clauses would seem to be becoming more common in 
certain areas of government, such as the health sector.94 The Public 
Service Code of Conduct is fairly explicit about what level of freedom is 
permitted to public servants. 
Generally, public servants have the same rights of free speech and 
independence in the conduct of their private affairs as other members of 
the public. However, they also have a duty not to compromise their 
employer by public criticism of, or comment on, policies with which they 
have been professionally involved or associated. Public servants should 
therefore ensure that their contribution to any public debate or discussion 
on such matters maintains the discretion appropriate to the position they 
hold, and is compatible with the need to maintain a politically neutral 
Public Service. Employees occupying senior positions or working closely 
with Ministers need to exercise particular care in this regard. 
91 Police v O'Connor [1992] lNZLR 87, 98. 
92 Section 4 BORA. 
93 Section 5 BORA. 
94 This was the indication, at least, from Dr Peter Roberts, Director of Intensive Care at 
Wellington Hospital and spokesperson for the Coalition on Public Health, at a recent lecture on 
whistleblowing at Wellington School of Medicine (31 August 1994). 
33 
Public servants are therefore not able to express their opinions about 
certain matters without fear of retribution. Restrictions on comment about 
a private company's policies are also common. Other well-established 
limitations on speech are connected with fiduciary relationships. 
Examples of this are duties of confidentiality between solicitor and client, 
doctor and patient, priest and penitent, or banker and client. Clearly, then, 
in New Zealand, the right to freedom of speech is subject to numerous 
limitations. 
Since the passing of the Bill of Rights, however, the reasonableness of 
these limitations has to be questioned. Although the Bill of Rights is not 
higher law95, its constitutional position, as a statement of commitment to 
supporting fundamental human rights, is extremely strong, and is treated 
as such by the courts.96 Even long-established limitations on the right to 
speak out should not, therefore, escape scrutiny in this new era. 
Obviously, there will be occasions on which confidentiality is a vital 
concern, which may well override an individual's right to freedom of 
speech, or the public's right to know. Instances of this in the official 
information regime are the need to preserve free and frank advice 
between Departments and Ministers, national security and so on. The 
reasonableness of the limitations on freedom of expression allowed under 
section 5 will be governed by the same types of consideration. By the 
same token, such areas as solicitor/client confidentiality involve principles 
about access to justice, and the necessity of placing trust and confidence 
in another. This should not be lightly undermined. Some, indeed, say that 
legal professional privilege should not be undermined at all, but should be 
expressly excluded from the ambit of the statute. 97 
95 The Bill of Rights is in the form of an ordinary statute without any form of entrenchment 
Courts cannot strike down legislative provisions which are clearly incompatible with the BORA 
(setion 4). 
96 R. v Goodwin (1993] 2 NZLR 153, particularly thejudgment of Cooke P. 
97 B. Slane "Views of the Privacy Commissioner Prepared for Hon Phil Goff on the Draft 
Whistleblowers Protection Bill" in Privacy Act 1993: a selection of background materials on the 
Privacy Act 1993 and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, July 1992-April 1994, paragraph 
4. 
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However, under the Bill of Rights, we are required to minimise inhibitions 
of freedom of speech. I do not believe that the requirements of 
confidentiality are absolute, any more than the right to speak out is 
absolute. The best way to protect all competing rights in this area, with the 
minimum of limitations on either, is to allow people to come forward with 
information, but ensure that they give that information to a specific neutral 
and independent authority, which will be able to preserve confidentiality 
as far as possible. 98 Also, the nature of the information given should 
relate to a serious matter, when breaching a confidence such as that 
required between doctor and patient. A whistleblowing agency should not 
provide an excuse for airing trivial grievances. Such information cannot be 
seen as an exercise of freedom of expression which will outweigh 
fiduciary principles. 
4. The position of the media 
It seems strange, however, to speak of a right to freedom of expression 
encompassing a public right to know what is going on, and of public 
participatory democracy and yet to discourage the transmission of public 
interest information directly to the public. The news media are commonly 
regarded as the public's representatives; their reporting is the only means 
by which the public in general can get to hear of what is going on in 
government and elsewhere. Investigative journalism has had a great deal 
to do with revelations of misconduct and illegality in the past. Yet, under 
the proposed scheme, and all the overseas legislation considered, a 
whistleblower who gives public interest information to the media is not 
protected by the anti-victimisation provisions of the statute. 99 How can 
legitimacy of government be increased when investigations are conducted 
by a governmental authority, in secret? 
There is a danger, here, that any proposed authority will be seen as a 
means to cover up, rather than reveal and deter, government 
mismanagement, or detrimental behaviour by large corporations. Similar 
98 The position of the media should also be considered, however, as discussed above. It may be 
seen as vital to true open government that much of the information given by whistleblowers is not 
kept secret by the investigating agency, but is brought to the public's attention via the media. 
99 Only "appropriate" disclosures of public interest information can be the source of legislative 
protection; "appropriate" is defined as information given (only) to the proposed Whistleblower 
Protection Authority. See Clause 6 (b), in Appendix A. 
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suspicions have been voiced lately by the fracas over the so-called 
''winebox" case, the alleged tax avoidance or evasion scandal involving 
companies banking in the Cook Islands. These suspicions must be 
allayed if a whistleblower authority is ever to have any real credibility. 
Yet, there is a case to be made also for keeping investigations into 
alleged wrongdoing under wraps, at least until such wrongdoing is proved. 
Whistleblowers at present tend to leak information to the media, but this is 
not always the best way to further the public interest. Unsubstantiated 
allegations which are widely publicised through the news media, however 
genuine the motives of the informant, can cause irreparable damage to 
the organisations about which the information is given. The media are not 
always in the best position to come to a thorough understanding of the 
facts of the situation. Organisations are put on the defensive, and are 
reluctant to reveal further information to reporters. Part of the reason for 
this is the fear of misreporting. This, it must be said, is no idle fear; the 
case of Neil Pugmire, for instance, revealed some spectacular instances 
of misreporting by newspapers and broadcasters. The media also have a 
tendency to align the public interest with their own interests. 100 The two 
are not synonymous. Sometimes, sensationalism appears to overrule 
strict adherence to facts. When one is talking of issues which may be 
highly sensitive, commercially or otherwise, pre-investigation publication 
by the media is not always the best way to serve the public interest. 
However, it cannot be denied that the media have an extremely important 
role to play in the matter of disseminating public interest information, and 
that this must be protected, while bearing in mind also the interests of 
other parties involved. It is unclear to what extent the Whistleblowers 
Protection Bill, in its present form, preserves this media role. For the 
reasons outlined above, I agree that whistleblowers should not be actively 
encouraged (by providing protection from victimisation) to go direct to the 
media. It should be expressly stated, however, that the public interest 
defence to such actions as breach of confidence remains, so that any 
whistleblower who chooses to take the risk of reprisal may still be able to 
100 See Lion Laboratories, above note 54. 
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reveal information to the media. As it stands, it is uncertain whether the 
Bill is intended to codify the law relating to public interest information.101 
Even if it does not, in assessing whether the defence is available, the 
courts are likely to have an eye to the statutory definition of public interest 
information This is no bad thing. However, they could also consider that, 
given that the legislation provides a clear "proper person" to whom to give 
information, the whistleblower would never be justified in going direct to 
the media. The legislation should contain a statement that the only 
difference blowing the whistle to the media should make is to create an 
inability to access the anti-victimisation provisions. A requirement that the 
whistleblower authority report publicly on cases of proven wrongdoing 
would also help to ensure a belief in the independence of the system. 
These amendments would preserve the right of freedom of speech to its 
fullest extent, given that the interests of the employer organisations or 
third parties need to be considered. 
B. The Effects of State Restructuring 
1. Institutional change 
There are probably a variety of reasons for the sudden interest in the 
issue of officially protected disclosures of confidential information. The 
main impetus for change has probably occured, however, as a result of 
the vast changes which have taken place in the way the State is 
perceived, and the way it operates in practice. There have been huge 
changes which have taken place in the New Zealand public sector over 
the last decade. These have arguably had benefits in that the 
restructuring has, for example, provided a smaller, more focused state 
sector and clearer accounting systems. The reforms, however, have also 
had their detrimental effects upon the public's perception of government. 
The rapidity with which restructuring has occurred appear to have shaken 
public confidence both in the politicians and bureaucrats. The Chief 
Ombudsman has been quoted as saying: 102 
101 Although, since it is not expressed to be a code, the likelihood is that it would not be 
interpreted as such. 
102 "Chief Ombudsman to stand down" The Dominion Wellington July 26 1994, page 2. 
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... people's confidence in the way political decisions were made or the 
processes of government had been eroded with the speed of changes and 
there was an urgent need to restore public confidence. "We are working 
hard to get ministers to adjust to changes though we are not happy or 
satisfied that the objectives of the Freedom of Information Act have been 
property met and we have to move fast to restore people's confidence .. . 
The changes to state and local government were supposed to be for the 
better but I believe there is still considerable room for improvement." 
One of the ways of restoring confidence in the system may well be to 
enhance people's ability to have complaints addressed. As already 
discussed, enabling whistleblowers to air their grievances through an 
adequate authority leads to a public perception that mistakes can come to 
light and be corrected. 
Dismay at the changes may be unwarranted. It may be possible to paint a 
rosy picture of how state restructuring has increased accountability within 
the New Zealand government system. It may be clearer, for example, what 
the extent of ministerial responsibility to Parliament is. Chief executives 
are more visible than in the past, and are responsible for the day to day 
running of departments. The public knows who to blame for mistakes 
which are made and of whom to demand reparation. In the new, 
streamlined, ostensibly more efficient public sector, it is extremely 
important that errors or mismanagement should be brought to light and 
dealt with appropriately. Whistleblowers should be encouraged, as they 
enhance accountability further. 
More specifically, other aspects of state restructuring are also relevant to 
the issue of whistleblowing. First is the creation of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) and Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs), as state-
owned but commercially-based entities. The nature of these bodies has 
had an effect upon principles about official information. When faced with 
requests for information, SOEs and CHEs frequently assert that it is not 
available, for reasons of commercial sensitivity. 103 However, not 
everything which is commercial would necessarily prejudice these 
organisations if it were made public.104 As state entities, they are still 
subject to principles of open government and the public has a significant 
103 This reason for withholding infonnation under the Official Infonnation Act is contained in 
section 9 (2) (b). 
104 As above note 102. 
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interest in knowing what is going on. The new atmosphere of secrecy in 
these areas of great public concern has to be combatted. 
One way to do this might be to allow employees, with inside information, 
to come forward with their grievances to an appropriate authority which 
will give priority to the public interest. Such an authority should, however, 
also be able to protect the interests of the CHE, or the SOE, by preventing 
the divulgence of information which is truly commercially sensitive. At 
present, the Ombudsman clearly has the jurisdiction to deal with 
complaints both from concerned employees, and from people whose 
requests for information are refused. However, the Ombudsman cannot 
prevent whistleblower victimisation, and the incidence of reporting by 
employees of the commercial bodies themselves will not therefore be 
particularly high. 
2. Public sector employment 
The core state sector also underwent radical changes during the late 
1980s. Departments were significantly scaled down, and geared more 
explicitly towards development of policy and monitoring activities of other 
organisations. 105 The introduction of the State Services Act in 1988 and 
the Public Finance Act in 1989 further altered both the employment 
relationship and the trails of accountability within government. Of 
particular relevance for whistleblowing is the former. 
In place of a "career'' public service, where employees had a good deal of 
job security, New Zealand now has state servants who are employed on a 
basis very like that in private, commercial organisations. The chief 
executive of a department, herself on a nominally fixed-term contract, 106 is 
responsible for the hiring and firing of employees. 107 The Employment 
Contracts Act regulates contracts in both private and public sector, and 
does not impose different obligations on the public sector employment 
lOS John Martin Public Service and the Public Servant: Administrative practice in a time of 
change (State Services Commission, Wellington 1991) 5. 
106 Section 38(1), State Sector Act 1988. A chief executive is appointed for a term of not more 
than 5 years. She is, however, eligible for reappointment from time to time (subsection 2). 
107 Section 59 State Sector Act 1988. (2) provides that the chief executive shall have all the 
rights, duties and powers of an employer in respect of departmental staff for whom she is 
responsible. 
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relationship. The same terms of fidelity and confidentiality, for instance, 
will clearly be implied into the public service employment contract. On the 
face of it, then, it may seem that there is no difference between public and 
private sector employment. 
However, the nature of the public servant's job is still different in one very 
important respect. State sector employees have duties both to the 
government, to enable it to act effectively, and to the public. As Jackson 
says, "[a)mbiguity therefore lies at the heart of the conception of public 
service". 108 This ambiguity is apparent from the long title to the State 
Sector Act, which states that it is (inter alia) an Act " (a) to ensure that 
employees in the State services are imbued with the spirit of service to the 
community". The Public Service Code of Conduct, however, focuses 
primarily on the principle that "[e)mployees should fulfil their lawful 
obligations to Government with professionalism and integrity."109 The 
Code goes on to say that "the first priority for public servants is to carry 
out Government policy."110 In doing so, they are to "act in a manner which 
will bear the closest public scrutiny," and also have to avoid conflicts of 
interest or integrity. 111 This is not a statement that public servants have a 
duty to consider the public interest as such, so much as an equation of 
the public interest with having the Government look good. 
What, therefore, should a public servant do if he or she believes that his 
or her department is not acting in the public interest? This is a key 
question for many potential whistleblowers. The traditional response is 
"obey or resign". However, at present, some disgruntled public servants 
choose to leak information to the media, and hope that they will not be 
traced. A small minority of others prefer to make a public stand on the 
issue, and face the consequences. 
Jackson seems to indicate that, where the Government is no longer acting 
in the public interest, then the duty to obey ceases. "The duty public 
servants owe to the government of the day is engaged only as long as the 
108 MW Jackson "The Public Interest, Public Service and Democracy" (1988) 47 Australian 
Journal of Public Administration 241, 242 . 
109 State Services Commission Public Service Code of Conduct (SSC, Wellington, 1990) 9. 
110 Ibid, page 10. 
111 Ibid, page 21. 
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government is acting in the public interest."112 However, this still leaves 
the question as to who is to decide what the public interest is. Some 
would claim that the sole arbiter is the government of the day.113 Others 
would say that each public servant must use his or her own conscience. 
Each position has its problems. There will be some situations in which it is 
clear that the government, or the department, is acting contrary to the 
public interest. A public servant is often in a unique position to notice 
illegality, misleading of Parliament, and so on, and should be able to claim 
that the public interest requires disclosure of the information. 114 However, 
disagreements about matters of policy direction are more difficult. For 
example, a (presently unpublicised) government policy of selling off state 
housing may be totally contrary to my conception of what the public 
interest requires. But whether I am entitled to reveal that information 
ahead of time, so that public opinion may take its toll on the elected 
representatives is another matter. 115 The Code of Conduct indicates that 
revelations of such matters would be grounds for disciplinary action. I 
would suggest that, as a general rule, this is correct. Government cannot 
function efficiently if policies cannot be developed by the elected 
representatives of the public with a reasonable degree of secrecy. The 
public should be consulted as and when appropriate, but cannot be 
involved at every stage of what are frequently highly complicated 
processes. Revelations about unofficial policy debates could often be 
unnecessarily counterproductive. Such information is, no doubt, of interest 
to the public, but this does not equate with being "in the public 
interest". 116 
112 As above note 108, 247. 
113 Otherwise known as g.o.d. The Thatcher government argued this in the prosecution of Clive 
Ponting, and it was seemingly accepted by the court, although not by the jury, who acquitted 
Ponting of charges under the Official Secrets Act. See Jackson's comments, above note 108. 
114 Clive Ponting revealed that Government statements justifying the sinking of the Argentinian 
battle cruiser, the General Belgrano, were false. He was tried for breach of the Official Secrets 
Act. The Thatcher government attempted to argue that only the government could decide what 
the public interest was. 
115 Acceptance of such revelations could lead to people being what Uhr calls "bureaucratic 
guerrillas". J. Uhr "Ethics and Public Service" (1988) 47 Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 109, 116. 
116 The distinction is drawn in Lion Laboratories v Evans, above note 54. 
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3. Conclusions 
At the heart of the New Zealand democratic system lie the principles of 
accountability, open government and preservation of human rights. 
Encouragement of whistleblowers, within certain limits, would be perfectly 
in line with these principles, and would, in fact, enhance them. Legitimacy 
of government will be increased by encouraging people to disclose 
information in the public interest. Protecting informants from victimisation 
in their employment gives them more power over what happens in the 
workplace, and therefore a greater willingness to co-operate with the 
system when it is working well. Also, if the public feels that the 
government is encouraging people to speak out, instead of trying to hide 
information, then public perceptions of government will certainly improve. 
There must be, however, limitations on protection for whistleblowers, so 
long as these are justified in a free and democratic society. The 
justification of these limitations is determined by reference to the need to 
balance a whistleblower's interests with the interests of others involved. 
The remaining issue which has to be considered here is potentially the 
most crucial to this balancing exercise, that is, determining which authority 
is best suited to investigating complaints and protecting whistleblowers. 
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PART IV 
THE PROPER PERSON TO RECEIVE INFORMATION 
Lord Denning, in Initial Services v Putteri/1, qualified his defence of 
disclosure in the public interest by stating that the disclosure had to be to 
a "proper person to receive the information".117 This has a sound basis in 
common sense. Giving information to the correct authority may enable 
mistakes to be corrected quickly and efficiently, by those in the best 
position to do so. Also, the qualification may prevent unsubstantiated 
allegations from being widely broadcast by the media, or other agencies, 
to the detriment of the employer's reputation. Such damage can frequently 
be irreparable. It cannot be said to be in the public interest to reveal 
information with no foundation in truth. Also, as we have seen, the 
tendency of the news media to sensationalise matters which may be 
politically contentious, for example, may in fact hinder the public interest. 
Some limitations on who should receive information given by 
whistleblowers are therefore justified. 
Any agency nominated as an appropriate recipient for whistleblowing 
complaints must have particular features: 
• It must be able fully to investigate allegations made by whistleblowers. 
This should include power to demand documents, power to require the 
giving of evidence, and so on. 
• If the agency discovers that the allegation is well-founded, it should be 
able to ensure that action is taken to correct errors, and ensure that 
the situation does not recur. This could take several forms. The 
authority could be given power to punish directly. 118 It should be able, 
where necessary, to refer the case to specialised authorities for 
enforcement such as the police, the Privacy Commissioner or the 
Serious Fraud Office. It should also make reports and 
recommendations to the organisation and, if nothing is done, to 
Parliament. Mandatory public reporting when an investigation reveals 
serious wrongdoing should also be considered. 
117 [1968] I QB 396, 405. 
118 Such powers could include firing a miscreant, or enforcing repayment of sums 
misappropriated. 
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• The agency should be able to protect the whistleblower's anonymity. 
Where possible, his or her identity should be kept confidential to the 
agency. However, adequate investigation of complaints may often 
require the disclosure of the informant's identity, as this could affect 
the 'offending' organisation's right to be heard. How allegations are 
countered may depend on knowing the source of the information. 
Protection should take the form of ensuring that anti-victimisation 
provisions of whistleblower legislation are complied with. Even if the 
provisions are actually enforced by another body, such as the Human 
Rights Commission, the whistleblower agency should be aware of the 
proceedings, and be a contact point for the whistleblower. This will 
save confusion. 
Considering these factors, therefore, along with the need to achieve a 
result which best represents all parties' interests, the options for 
whistleblower protection are set out below. 
A. Internal Reporting Only 
One option is not to have a separate, external agency, but to deal with 
whistleblowing matters in-house. It may well be possible to strengthen 
internal complaints procedures to deal with the concerns of many 
whistleblowers. This will be especially true if the information, while clearly 
public interest information, is of a fairly minor nature. As long as an 
organisation is seen to be taking such complaints seriously, and to be 
willing to take appropriate action, this would be a perfectly adequate way 
to deal with many employees' problems. 
It would obviously be in the employer's interests to promote this option. 
Outside interference and unwarranted publicity would be avoided. The 
employer could, therefore, develop the most effective ways of dealing with 
such matters unhindered. Internal reporting would also be a cheap option 
for the state, as costs of investigation and remedy would be placed solely 
on the organisation involved. 
The dangers with relying purely on the organisation itself to deal with 
whistleblower complaints, however, significantly outweigh the benefits. 
First, the employer may not in fact be prepared to act on any complaints. 
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When nothing happens, the whistleblower therefore needs somewhere 
else to go. Secondly, even if the employer is prepared to act in good faith, 
an internal complaints system may not be perceived by the employees as 
being neutral and effective. The temptation is very much to see the 
"company ombudsman" as being a servant of those about whom one is 
complaining. An employee is likely to assume that the company will 
protect its own interests, come what may. Thirdly, the person to whom 
complaints should be directed may be implicated in the wrongdoing. 
Where this occurs, the whistleblower clearly needs to be able to bypass 
internal channels, and give the information to an outside authority. 
Fourthly, only an external agency can deal with many cases of 
whistleblower victimisation, if the legislation is breached. It is unrealistic to 
assume that managers of organisations will often admit fault, and 
voluntarily reinstate or compensate an individual whom they themselves 
have harassed. 
I believe that it is vital , both from the perspectives of efficiency and cost, 
to encourage organisations to develop adequate in-house complaints 
procedures, particularly as regards minor matters. It would accord with 
sound business sense to try to accommodate complaints internally, in as 
supportive an atmosphere as possible. This ensures that employees are 
better satisfied, and also that unsound management practices are quickly 
and effectively dealt with. The organisation will be able to function more 
efficiently as a result. Whistleblowing legislation may be just the prod 
which is needed to encourage more organisations to develop good 
internal procedures; those that do will have little to fear. 119 
Legislation in this area 
organisations to voluntarily 
Protection Bill, as it stands 
should, therefore, actively encourage 
improve practices. The Whistleblowers' 
at present, does not address this issue, 
however. In fact, as it stands, the legislation would probably discourage 
employees from pursuing internal channels of complaint. Protection from 
victimisation is only available to those making or intending to make 
"appropriate disclosures of public interest information".120 The latter is 
defined in clause 6 as information which is disclosed to the Authority. 
119 See "Whistleblowing: a curse on ineffective organisations", above note 25. 
12° Clause 29, Whistleblowers Protection Bill. 
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There would therefore be no protection for those who disclose public 
interest information internally, not wishing to go to an external authority, 
and who suffer promotional disadvantages, for example, as a result. 121 As 
we have seen, the primary deterrent to whistleblowers is fear of reprisal. 
Unless protection is afforded for those who use their internal channels, 
therefore, it will encourage people to bypass their organisation, and go 
straight to the external authority. Admittedly, under clause 22 (1) (d), the 
authority may refuse to investigate the complaint if the subject matter is 
trivial. A complainant would therefore have to use internal procedures. 
However, much that is not 'trivial' would be able to be dealt with at an 
organisational level also. The Bill should be amended to extend protection 
to those who blow the whistle more quietly. 
Be that as it may, it is vital that whistleblower protection allows the 
informant to bypass internal channels in certain circumstances. Extremely 
serious complaints may not be adequately dealt with internally. There may 
be a lack, or perceived lack, of goodwill on the part of those who are 
nominated to hear complaints. They may even be involved themselves in 
the wrongdoing. Grievances about victimisation, contrary to any 
legislative provisions, should also be heard by an external agency, as 
indicated above. Whistleblower protection would, therefore, be 
inadequate without provision of an external authority to whom informants 
may turn where appropriate. 
B. A New Authority 
The proposal contained in the Whistleblowers' Protection Bill is to create 
a totally new authority, separate and independent, along the lines of the 
Privacy Commissioner's office. The office would be responsible to 
Parliament. 
The authority's investigative and reporting powers would be broadly 
similar to those of the Ombudsman. Part IV of the Bill details the 
procedures for investigation, and much has been taken straight from the 
121 This contrasts with the Protected Disclosures Bill in New South Wales, for example. Clause 8 
states that, to be protected by the Act, a disclosure must be made a) to an investigating authority; 
or ... c) to another officer of the public authority or investigating authority to which the public 
official belongs in accordance with an internal procedure established by the authority for the 
reporting of [public interest information] . 
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Ombudsmen Act 1975.122 Part V, however, which sets out the unlawful 
grounds of discrimination and provides remedies for injury, closely follows 
the Privacy Act 1993 in utilising the Human Rights Act 1993 procedures. 
A totally new and separate authority would have considerable benefits as 
a means of protecting whistleblowers. First, it would be fairly easily 
identifiable as the channel through which to go, if one wished to make 
disclosures of public interest information.123 Ease of access is essential to 
the success of the system. Potential whistleblowers who have until now 
been deterred from making disclosures of information will still not be 
prepared to act if significant barriers are placed in their way. Secondly, 
such an authority would be neutral. Provided that an adequate voice were 
left for the media, it would also be seen to be non-partisan. Perceived and 
actual neutrality is vital for whistleblowers to have confidence that 
something will be done and adequate protection will in fact be available. 
The organisation about which the complaint is made will also be much 
more prepared to co-operate with a non-partisan agency. Thirdly, a 
separate authority could easily be made to cover the private as well as the 
public sector. It could engage staff to specialise in particular areas of 
public interest information, for example the environment. It would then be 
irrelevant whether the source of the material were private or public sector. 
Fourthly, such an authority could build up specialised knowledge about 
problems peculiar to whistleblowing. 124 
The disadvantages, however, are also significant. First here is the cost of 
establishing such an authority.125 It would probably need a similar size of 
staff and similar facilities to those of the Privacy Commissioner. An 
assessment of how much the Privacy Commissioner's office costs to run 
122 For example, clause 23 (requirement to inform the person to whom the investigation relates) 
is identical with s. 18 (1) of the Ombudsmen Act; the ability to summon people to give evidence 
on oath in clause 24 mirrors s. 19 (2); clause 27, dealing with powers of recommendation and 
report is very similar to s. 22. 
123 This comment is, however, qualified slightly below, when considering the multiplication of 
small authorities recently. 
124 For example, the difficulties inherent in proving that an employee suffered unlawful 
discrimination, in terms of clause 29 WPB, could be mitigated by specialised knowledge gained 
from dealing with such cases in the past. 
125 The Privacy Commissioner, among others, has expressed concern at the cost of such an 
authority, and at the problem with overlapping jurisdictions. See above note 97 
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would therefore be fairly near the mark. Especially given the very recent 
creation of the latter body, I envisage that there will be a good deal of 
dissent about spending as much again for a similar unit. 
Secondly, New Zealand already has several small authorities such as 
this, all operating more or less independently of one another. The problem 
with introducing yet another into the field is that the areas of jurisdiction of 
many of these authorities are in danger of overlapping. This could be 
confusing for potential clients of the agencies; for example, it may not be 
immediately obvious now whether to direct a grievance to the Privacy 
Commissioner or to the Ombudsman. Introducing a third possibility of the 
Whistleblower Protection Authority would only add to the confusion. It also 
causes problems for the investigating agencies themselves. Certain 
matters may in fact be better dealt with by a different authority with a 
specialisation in the area. Also, there is the danger of forum shopping by 
the complainant. If one authority does not produce the result that he or 
she wants, the temptation is to go on to an alternative authority, which 
could start the investigation again from scratch. If a different result is 
achieved, tension is created between the authorities, and the integrity of 
each is undermined. Even if the same result is achieved, the organisation 
about which the complaint is made has suffered a good deal of hassle, 
which may be out of proportion to the subject matter of the complaint. 
The problems with a separate authority can be mitigated or challenged to 
some degree. The cost can be minimised by ensuring that people are 
encouraged to complain within their organisations first. 126 Also, if I am 
right, and encouragement of whistleblowing has positive effects on 
management standards particularly, then financial savings may be 
forthcoming. Direct financial benefits may arise if revelations are made 
about fraud or significant waste of public money, enabling undesirable 
drains on funds to be stopped. Overlapping jurisdictions need not be too 
difficult to handle if there is a reasonable amount of communication 
between the various agencies, and an ability in the legislation for each 
126 See above 
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authority to refer the matter on to a more appropriate body where 
necessary. This ability is provided in the Bill. 127 
C. The Ombudsman 
A likely alternative to establishing a separate authority to protect 
whistleblowers would be to extend the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to 
cover investigation and protection of whistleblowers. 128 This would be 
cheaper than setting up a whole new office, although substantial 
resources would still be needed to enable the Ombudsman to fulfil this 
additional role. A separate section could be formed within the 
Ombudsman's office to deal with whistleblowers. 
The Ombudsman already has the capacity to receive complaints from 
some whistleblowers within the public service. Section 13 of the 
Ombudsmen Act 1975 states that Ombudsmen are to: 
investigate any decision or recommendation made, or any act done or 
omitted ... relating to a matter of administration ... in or by any of the 
Departments or organisations named .. . in Parts I and II of the First 
Schedule to this act, or by any committee ... or by any officer, employee, 
or member of any such Department or organisation in his capacity as such 
officer, employee or member. 
Thus, a public servant may complain about matters in a government 
department, or a contractor working for an SOE may make disclosures 
about the company, provided that it relates to a "matter of administration". 
The scope of this proviso is rather unclear. It seems to have been 
accepted that it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between 
127 Clause 28 (2)(b) allows the Authority to refer the matter to an appropriate enforcement 
agency, once it has been established that the grievance relates to public interest information and 
has some substance to it. A non-exhaustive list of potentially appropriate agencies are included in 
subclause (6). As the Privacy Commissioner points out, this list will rapidly be outdated, and 
probably would be better placed in a Schedule to the Act (see above note 97) The role of the 
Authority after referral is a supervisory one. It would also be able to take action on any 
subsequent victimisation of the employee in question. 
128 Another alternative which has been suggested is to use the Office of the Auditor-General. 
However, I have not considered this in detail. I believe that the Auditor-General's jurisdiction is 
too narrow at present to be a serious contender for the position. Information about financial 
matters may be appropriately referred to the Auditor-General for investigation, but the category of 
public information is not, and cannot be limited to fiscal concerns. It would, I suggest, be straying 
too far from his or her specialised role, for example, to require the Auditor-General to investigate 
complaints about toxic waste dumping by a private company. 
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administration and policy. 129 The Ombudsman therefore has a wide ability 
to investigate complaints, and may not be too inhibited by departments 
claiming that policy is at stake. 
The Ombudsman's jurisdiction extends to decisions made about 
employment matters. Section 22 (1) (b) states that if the Ombudsman 
believes that a decision is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive or improperly 
discriminatory, he or she can recommend that the decision be cancelled 
or varied. This means that there are already some avenues available for 
some whistleblowers to challenge victimisation in the workplace. 
However, there are clearly limits to what the Ombudsman can achieve. 
First, the decisionmaker must be one to which the Act relates. Second, the 
Ombudsman's remedial powers are recommendatory only, although the 
recommendations carry a good deal of weight in practice. More 
substantive remedies may be deemed appropriate in some cases of 
whistleblower victimisation. However, these can be provided by using the 
Human Rights Act procedures, as envisaged by the Bill. Third, the 
grounds of "improper discrimination" do not, at present, include 
discrimination because one is a whistleblower. The proposed legislation 
would rectify this. 
The greatest impediment to using the Ombudsman as the whistleblowers' 
authority, however, would be if the legislation covered both the private 
and the public sectors. This is the case as the Bill stands at present. Of 
course, the distincfion between public and private sectors has become 
increasingly blurred, especially with state restructuring, and this trend 
looks likely to continue with more and more contracting out of service 
provision by the state. The Ombudsman already has dealings with state 
commercial entities, such as SOEs and CHEs, and is therefore familiar 
with the profit-making ethos. However, the relationship is not always an 
easy one. Also, the Ombudsman is perceived as inextricably linked with 
checks and balances on government. The concerns within the truly private 
sector are somewhat different. I suggest that it could undermine the 
present role of the Ombudsman if it were seen to be investigating the 
private sector in the same way as the public. 
129 Sir George Laking "The Ombudsman in Transition" (1987) 17 VUWLR 309-310. 
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This concern may, however, not prove to be an insurmountable problem 
with whistleblowing. According to the Bill , as mentioned above, if the 
nominated Authority decides that the matter would be better investigated 
by a different body, it may refer it on. Many concerns which arise in the 
private sector would involve such issues as illegal conduct. There will 
frequently be other authorities, such as the police, to which the 
Ombudsman could refer the complaint for investigation. If a private firm 
has misused public funds, there is perhaps little reason why the 
Ombudsman, as a Parliamentary officer, should not be able to conduct an 
investigation and report as necessary. 
Perhaps the main area of tension will be that of environmental damage by 
private organisations. However, this is an area of significant public 
interest, and one which the Government alone can adequately regulate. It 
may be that investigation by the Ombudsman would not be as difficult as it 
seems. It may even be that environmental matters would automatically be 
referred on to the Commissioner for the Environment. 
D. Conclusions 
Personally, I have a preference for the Ombudsman as the most 
appropriate authority to deal with whistleblowers. The reason is not 
particularly that of cost, as substantial resources will need to be allocated 
to whichever agency is empowered to deal with the issue. The 
Ombudsman, however, is a well-established and highly respected 
institution within the New Zealand governmental system. It is easily 
identifiable for whistleblowers, and easily accessible. The office is well 
used to dealing with matters concerning the public interest, and already 
have the capacity to deal with certain types of whistleblowers. Nominating 
the Ombudsman as the authority for whistleblowers would not require an 
impossible extension of its jurisdiction, although the application of the 
legislation to the private sector might cause a few problems at first. 
However, the office has become used to dealing with state commercial 
organisations over the last decade, and the territory should not be too 
unfamiliar. The creation of a new and separate Whistleblowers Protection 
Authority would seem to be unnecessary. 
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CONCLUSION 
The concept of legislation to provide protection for whistleblowers is 
arousing a good deal of interest in New Zealand at present. Some of the 
immediate interest is, no doubt, a direct result of the case of Neil Pugmire, 
which is still fresh in people's minds. However, it is also growingly 
recognised that encouragement of whistleblowers might be a further way 
to increase the openness and accountability of government, and to 
address pressing social concerns such as environmental hazards. There 
is a growing number of examples of whistleblower legislation overseas to 
prompt serious consideration of the issue here. There are also good local 
justifications for protecting those who come forward with public interest 
information, and the Ombudsman is the most appropriate authority to 
provide that protection. 
As John McMillan states:130 
Telling the truth should be neither difficult nor costly. Employment in an 
organisation should not require that a person accepts complicity in all 
activities which the employer has decided to pursue or to conceal. To 
accept that employees can be persecuted for honesty, loyalty, or 
upholding the public trust undennines some of the legal and moral 
principles on which a society is necessarily based. 
We can no longer leave our whistleblowers to live on the edge. 
130 J. McMillan "Legal Protection of Whistleblowers" in S Prosser, R Wear and J Nethercote 
Corruption and Refonn: the Fitzgerald Vision (University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1990) 
203, 210. 
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Whutleblower.s Protection 
(b) That informants who act in accordance with this Act shoU;ld _be recognised as acting responsibly and in the public mterest. 
(!) For attaining its purpose, this Act-(a) Constitutes a Whist1eblowers Protection Authority and 5 establishes procedures to facilitate and encourage disclosure of public interest information: (b) Provides for such disclosures to be properly investigated and dealt with: 
(c) Provides for the protection of persons (commonly: known I 0 a, whistleblowen) who make disclosures of public / interest information to the Authority: (d) Provides for remedies for such persons who encotmter discrimination or harassment for disclosing public interest information. 
15 
PART II 
DISCLOSUR.E OF PtJBUC INTER.EST INFORMATION 6. Making disclosure oC public interest informadon-(1) Public interest information is information which relates to any conduct or activity, whether in the public sector or in the 20 private sector, that-
(a) Concerns the wuawful, corrupt, or unauthorised use of -public funds or public resources: (b) ls otherwise unlawful: (c) Constitutes a significant risk or danger, or is injurious, 25 to--
(i) Public health: 
(ii) Public safety: 
(iii) The environment: 
(iv) The maintenance of the law and justice, SO including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair trial. (2) Any person may disclose public int~est information to the Authority. 
(8) A person may: disclose to the Authority-(a) Information the disclosure of which could properly be withheld in accordance with-(i} The Official Information Act 198 2; or 
35 
(it) The Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act l 98 7: 
40 (b) Personal information the disclosure of which would breach the Privacy Act 1993 or a code of practice issued under section 63 of that Act: 
11:05 
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Whistleblowers Protection 5 
(c) Information the disclosure of which another enactment prohibits or regulates: 
(d) Information the disclosure of which would breach a confidence, unless the disclosure would be in the publ.ic interesi 
(4) A person may Cll3Close public interest information to the Authority either orall)' or in writin~. 
(5) If a person discloses Euhlic interest information orally, that person shall put the information in writing as soon as is practicable. 
(6) The Authority shall assist any person who wishes to disdosc public interest information to the Authority to put the disclosure in writing. 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 16; 1993, No. 28, ss. 34, 68 ; Whistleblowers Protection Ace 1993 (South Australia), s. 4 (1) 
6. Appropriate disclosures of public interest lnfonnatlon-A person discloses public interest information appropriately if, and only if,-
(a) The person-
. (i) Beli7ves. on reasonable grounds that the mformauon 1s true; or 
(ii) ls not in a position to form a belief on reasonable grounds about the truth of the information but believes on reasonable grounds that the information may be true and is of sufficient significance to justify its disclosure so that its truth may be investigated; and 
(b) The person discloses that information to the Authority. 
Cf. Whistleblowers Protection Act l 99S (South Australia), s. 5 (2) 
7. Inununity for appropriate disclosures of public interest information-No ~rson who malles an appropriate d~closurc of public interest information shall be subject to civil or criminal proceedings concerning that disclosure. 
Cf. Whlstleblowers Protection Act 1993 (South Australia), 
SS. 5 (1), 10 
8. O.fFence to disclose identity of informant-Every person commits an offence against this Act and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not cxceedin~ $2,000 who discloses, or who attempts or conspires to duclose, to any person any information which could reasonably be expected to 
+64 
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identify any person who has disclosed public; interest 
information appropriately under this Act without that person's 
consent. 
Cf. 1985, No. 120, s. 140 (1) 
PART Ill 
WHISTLE.BLO',VERS PltOTI:CTION At.rrHORITY 
5 
9. Whistleblowen Protection Authority constituted-
( 1) There shall be appointed, as an officer of P~liament, a 
Whistle blowers Protection Authority. (2) Subiect to seetlcn 15 of this Act, the Authority shall be l 0 
appointed by the Govem~r-Gencral on the recommendation of 
the House of ReprescntatlVes. (S) The Authority shall be a corporation sole with p~xperua.l 
succession and a seal of office, and shall have and may exerci.se 
all the rights, powers, and _privileges, and may incur all the 15 
liabilities and obligations, of a natural person of full age and 
capacity. 
Cf. 1986, No. 121, s. 4; 1998, No. 28, s. 1.2 10. Funcdo~ of Authority-(1) The functions of the 
Authority shall be-
20 
(a) To investigate any disclosure of public interest inf orm.ation made to the Authority: (b) To provide advice, cowiselling, and assistance to prospective inf onnants and J?rotectcd informants; 
(c) To monitor developJ!lcnts in relation to disclosures of 25 
public interest information: (d) To report to the House of Representatives or, as the case may be, the Prime Minister from time to time on any matter rc:la.ting to the disclosure of public interest infonnation, including the need for, or desirability of, 80 
taking legislative, administrative, or other action to give 6etter protection to infonnants: (e) To rilalc.e public statements in relation to disclosures of public intet"est information: (£} To review the cpcration cf this Act a.s required by !5 
section 19 of tliis Act: (g) To do anything incidental or conducive to the performance of the preceding functioflS: {h) To exerci.,e and perform such other functions, powers, and duties ;is are conferred or imposed on the .f.O 
Authority by or under this Act or any othet" enactment. 
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(i) The date of the conunenccment of this section (in the case of the first review carried out under this paragraph); or 
(ii) The date of the last review carried out under this paragraph (in the case of every subsequent 5 review); and 
(b) Consider whether any amendments to this Act are necessary or desirable; and 
(c) Report the Authority's findings to the House of Representatives. 10 
Cf. 1990, No. 72, s. 12; l 99S, No. 28, s. 26 
PART IV 
PROCEDURES 
A.duke and Counselling 
20. Advisory and counselling service-The Authority 15 shall provide advice, counselling, and assistance on the follo....,,ng matters to any person who discloses, or who notifies the Autfiority that he or she is considering disclosing, public interest information under this Act: 
(a) The kinds of di.5closures that may be made under this Act: 20 (b) The manner and form in which public interest information may be di!closed under this Act: (c) How particular information disclosed to the Authority may be disclosed under this Act and what consequences disclosure may have: 2 .5 (d) The protections and remedies available under this Act or otherwise in relation to discrimination or harassment: (e) The operation of this Act in any respect. 
Investigation by Authority 
.21. Action on receiving disclosure of rublic interest 30 information-On receiving a disclosure o public interest inform.ation under section 5 of this Act, the Audiority: shall-(a) Investigate the disclosure of public interest iriformatior.; or 
(b) Decide, in accordance with section 22 of this Act, to take S.5 no action on the disclosure. 
Cf. 1993, No. 28, s. 70 
.2.2. Auchorl~ rnay decide to take no action on disclosure of public interest information in certain circumstances-( 1) The Authority may decide to take no 40 
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action or, as the case may require, no further action, on any 
dis<:losw-e of public interest information if, but only if,-
(a) The Authority considers that under the law there is an 
adequate remedy, right of appeal, or agency for 
investigation to which it would nave been reasonable 
for tlie person disclosing the public interest 
information to resort; or 
(b) The Authority considers that the information disclosed is 
already publicly known or concerns a matter of public 
policy or debate on which diverse opinions may 
re.uonably or sincerely be held, uriless in the 
circumstances of the particular case there are other 
considerations which render it desirable in the public 
interest for the Authority to investigate the matter; or 
(c) The length of time that has elapsed between the date 
when the subject·matter of the disclosure of the 
public interest information arose and the date when 
the disclosure was made is such that an investigation 
of the information is no longer practicable or 
desirable; or 
(d) The subject-matter of the infonnation is trivial; or 
(e) The making of the disclosure is frivolous or vexatiow or is 
not made in good faith; or 
(~ The information is i."lSufficient to allow an investigation to 
proceed. 
(2) In any ~c where the Authority decides to take no action or, as the case may be, no further action, on any disclosure of 
public interest information, the Authority shall inform the 
person who made the disclosure of that decision and the SO reasons for it. 
Cf. 1975, No. 9, s. 17; 1977, No. 49, s. 35; 1981, No. 127, 
s. 3; 1982, No. 156, s. 9 (1); 1993, No. 28, s. 71 
Proceedtngs 
2S. Proceedings of Authority-(!) Before investigating 85 any matter under this Part of this Act, the Authority shall inform 
the person to whom the investigation relates of the Authority's 
intention to make the investigation. 
(2) Every investigation by the Authority under this Part of this Act shall be conducted in private. 
40 (3) The Authority may hear or obtain information from such persons as the Authority thinks fit, and may make such mquiries as the Authority thinks fit. 
Whistleblowm Protection 17 
(u) The Land Transport Safety Authority of New Zealand 
established by section 15 of the Land Transpon Act 
1993 or, as the case may require, the Director of 
Land Transport Safety appointed under section 24 of 
5 that Act: 
(v) The Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand 
established by section 3 of the Maritime Transport 
Act 1993 or, as the case may require, the Director of 
Maritime Safety appointed under section 13 of that 
10 Act. 
Cf. 197 5, No. 9, s. 22 
PARTV 
RE.."1£DIES FOR INJURY TO PROTECTED Ir-;FORMANTS 
29. Unla'wful discrimination-( 1) Subject to subsection (2) 
15 of this section, it shall be unlawful for any person to subject a 
person to any detriment, or to treat or threaten to treat that 
other person less favourably, or to harass that person, on the 
ground, or substantially on the ground, that the other person 
has made or intends to make an appropriate disclosure of 
20 public interest information. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section applies in relation to any of the 
following areas: 
(a) The making of an application for emplor:nent: 
(h) Employment, which term includes unpaid work: 
2.S (c) Participation in, or the making of an application for 
pa.'"ticipation in, a partnership: 
(d) Memb~hip, or the makin~ of a.T1 application for 
membership, of an industrial union or professional or 
trade assoaa.tion: 
30 (e) Access to any approval, authorisation, or qualification: 
(f) Vocational training, er the making of an application for 
vocational traming: 
(g) Access to places, vehicles, and facilities: 
(n) Access to goods and services: 
S5 (i) Access to land, housing, or other accommoda.tion: 
(j) Education. ' 
(3) The status of being a person who has made an 
appropriate disclosure of puolic interest information (in this Act 
referred to as protected informant status) shall be regarded as if 
40 it were a prohibited ground of discrimination within the 
meaning of the Human Rights Act 1993; and the provisions of 
+64 
18 Whi.stleblowm Protection 
Part n of that Act shall apply accordingly with the necessary 
modifications. 
c£ 1993, No. 82, SS. 62 (3), 63 (2) 
80. Complaints relating to breach of protection of informant-Any informant may make a complaint to the 5 Complaints Division that-
(a) His or her identity has been disclosed; and that (b) He or she is being or has been subjected to detriment or 
less favourable treatment or harassment in any of the 
areas described in section 29 of this Act,- l 0 on the ground, or substantially on the ground, that he or she has made or intends to make an appropriate disclosure of public interest information. 
81. Procedures under Human Rights Act 1993 to apply 
to comrlaints-Where any informant makes a complaint in 1.5 terms o section 30 of this Act, Parts Ill, IV, V, and VII of the Hwnan Rights Act 1993, so far as applicable and with all necessary modifications, shall apply in relation to that complaint as if it were a complaint under that Act. 
Cf. 1956, No. 6.5, s. 22r 20 
Exten.sion of Grounds of Prohibited Discrimination 
82. Application of provisions relating to Human Rights Act J99S-Every reference to a complaint wider the Human Rights Act 1993 shall be construed in the following enactments (which relate to choice of procedure where 25 circumstances give rise to a personal grievance by an employee) as including a reference to a complamt under section 30 of this Act: 
(a) The Police Act 1958: section 95: 
(b) The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986: section 6: 
{c) The New Zealand Symphony Orchestra Act 1988: section 
10: 
(d) The Broadcasting Act 1989: clause 7 of the First Schedule: (e) The Employment Contracts Act 1991: sections 26 (e) and 
S9. 
(2) Every reference to the Human Rights Act 1993 in section 12 (5) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1986 (which relates to the letting of residential premises) shall be construed 
so 
S5 
as if it included a reference to protected informant status. 
(S) The growids of prohibited discrimination specified in 40 section 28 (1) of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 shall be deemed to include protected informant status. 
APP~ND\')( 5 
Etv\Pl..OYMENT 
[27) 27. Personal grievance - (I) For the purposes of this Act, "personal 
grievance" means any grievance that an employee may have against the 
employee's employer or former employer because of a claim 
(a) That the employee has been unjustifiably dismissed; or 
(b) That the employee's employment, or one or more conditions 
thereof, is or are affected to the employee's disadvantage by some 
unjustifiable action by the employer (not being an action deriving 
solely from the interpretation, application, or operation, or 
disputed interpretation, application, or operation, of any provision 
of any employment contract); or 
(c) That the employee has been discriminated against in the employee's 
employment; or 
(d) That the employee has been sexually harassed in the employee's 
employment; or 
(e) That the employee has been subject to duress in the em?loyee's 
employment in relation to membership or non-membership of an 
employees organisation. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part of this Act, a "representa~ive", in 
relation to an employer and in relation to an alleged personal gnevance, 
means a person -
(a) Who is employed by that employer; and 
(b) Who either - . . 
(i) Has authority over the employee alleging the gnevan_ce; or 
(ii) Is in a position of authority over other employees m the 
workplace of the employee alleging the grievance. 
Cf 1987, No 77, s 210 
[28) 28. Discrimination - (I) For the purposes of section 27(1)(c) of this 
~et, an employee is discriminated against in that employee's employment 
if the employee's employer or a representative of that employer -
(a) Refuses or omits to offer or afford to that employee the same terms 
of employment, conditions of work, fringe benefits, or 
opportunities for training, promotion, and transfer as are made 
available for other employees of the same or substantially similar 
qualifications, experience, or skills employed in the same or 
substantially similar circumstances; or 
[(b)Dis~isses ~hat_ employee or subjects that employee to any 
detnment, m circumstances in which other employees employed 
by that employer on work of that description are not or would 
not_ be dismissed or subjected to such detriment; or 
(c) Retires that employee, or requires or causes that employee to retire 
or resign-) 
by reason of the colour, race, ethnic or national origins sex marital status 
[religious or ethical belief, or age) of that employee dr b; reason of tha; 
employee's involvement in the activities of an employees organisation. 
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